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.It is, indeed,the common fate of human reason in speculation, to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly aspossible, and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the foundation is a solid one or no.Arrivedat this point, all sorts of excuses are sought after, in order to console us for its want of stability, or rather,indeed, to enable Us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous an investigation.But what frees usduring the process of building from all apprehension or suspicion, and flatters us into the belief of its solidity,is this.A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the analysation of theconceptions which we already possess of objects.By this means we gain a multitude of cognitions, whichalthough really nothing more than elucidations or explanations of that which (though in a confused manner)was already thought in our conceptions, are, at least in respect of their form, prized as new introspections;whilst, so far as regards their matter or content, we have really made no addition to our conceptions, but onlydisinvolved them.But as this process does furnish a real priori knowledge, which has a sure progress anduseful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without being itself aware of it, assertions of a quite differentkind; in which, to given conceptions it adds others, a priori indeed, but entirely foreign to them, without ourknowing how it arrives at these, and, indeed, without such a question ever suggesting itself.I shall thereforeat once proceed to examine the difference between these two modes of knowledge.IV.Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.In all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is cogitated (I mention affirmativejudgements only here; the application to negative will be very easy), this relation is possible in two differentways.Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) inthe conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connectionwith it.In the first instance, I term the judgement analytical, in the second, synthetical.Analytical judgements(affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated throughidentity; those in which this connection is cogitated without identity, are called synthetical judgements.Theformer may be called explicative, the latter augmentative judgements; because the former add in the predicatenothing to the conception of the subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions, which werethought already in the subject, although in a confused manner; the latter add to our conceptions of the subjecta predicate which was not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein.ForIV.Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.18 The Critique of Pure Reasonexample, when I say, "All bodies are extended," this is an analytical judgement.For I need not go beyond theconception of body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is,become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to discover thispredicate in it: it is therefore an analytical judgement.On the other hand, when I say, "All bodies are heavy,"the predicate is something totally different from that which I think in the mere conception of a body.By theaddition of such a predicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgement.Judgements of experience, as such, are always synthetical.For it would be absurd to think of grounding ananalytical judgement on experience, because in forming such a judgement I need not go out of the sphere ofmy conceptions, and therefore recourse to the testimony of experience is quite unnecessary.That "bodies areextended" is not an empirical judgement, but a proposition which stands firm a priori.For before addressingmyself to experience, I already have in my conception all the requisite conditions for the judgement, and Ihave only to extract the predicate from the conception, according to the principle of contradiction, andthereby at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the judgement, a necessity which I could neverlearn from experience.On the other hand, though at first I do not at all include the predicate of weight in myconception of body in general, that conception still indicates an object of experience, a part of the totality ofexperience, to which I can still add other parts; and this I do when I recognize by observation that bodies areheavy.I can cognize beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the characteristics of extension,impenetrability, shape, etc., all which are cogitated in this conception.But now I extend my knowledge, andlooking back on experience from which I had derived this conception of body, I find weight at all timesconnected with the above characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions this as apredicate, and say, "All bodies are heavy." Thus it is experience upon which rests the possibility of thesynthesis of the predicate of weight with the conception of body, because both conceptions, although the oneis not contained in the other, still belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a whole,namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of intuitions.But to synthetical judgements a priori, such aid is entirely wanting [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.It is, indeed,the common fate of human reason in speculation, to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly aspossible, and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the foundation is a solid one or no.Arrivedat this point, all sorts of excuses are sought after, in order to console us for its want of stability, or rather,indeed, to enable Us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous an investigation.But what frees usduring the process of building from all apprehension or suspicion, and flatters us into the belief of its solidity,is this.A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the analysation of theconceptions which we already possess of objects.By this means we gain a multitude of cognitions, whichalthough really nothing more than elucidations or explanations of that which (though in a confused manner)was already thought in our conceptions, are, at least in respect of their form, prized as new introspections;whilst, so far as regards their matter or content, we have really made no addition to our conceptions, but onlydisinvolved them.But as this process does furnish a real priori knowledge, which has a sure progress anduseful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without being itself aware of it, assertions of a quite differentkind; in which, to given conceptions it adds others, a priori indeed, but entirely foreign to them, without ourknowing how it arrives at these, and, indeed, without such a question ever suggesting itself.I shall thereforeat once proceed to examine the difference between these two modes of knowledge.IV.Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.In all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is cogitated (I mention affirmativejudgements only here; the application to negative will be very easy), this relation is possible in two differentways.Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) inthe conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connectionwith it.In the first instance, I term the judgement analytical, in the second, synthetical.Analytical judgements(affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated throughidentity; those in which this connection is cogitated without identity, are called synthetical judgements.Theformer may be called explicative, the latter augmentative judgements; because the former add in the predicatenothing to the conception of the subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions, which werethought already in the subject, although in a confused manner; the latter add to our conceptions of the subjecta predicate which was not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein.ForIV.Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.18 The Critique of Pure Reasonexample, when I say, "All bodies are extended," this is an analytical judgement.For I need not go beyond theconception of body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is,become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to discover thispredicate in it: it is therefore an analytical judgement.On the other hand, when I say, "All bodies are heavy,"the predicate is something totally different from that which I think in the mere conception of a body.By theaddition of such a predicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgement.Judgements of experience, as such, are always synthetical.For it would be absurd to think of grounding ananalytical judgement on experience, because in forming such a judgement I need not go out of the sphere ofmy conceptions, and therefore recourse to the testimony of experience is quite unnecessary.That "bodies areextended" is not an empirical judgement, but a proposition which stands firm a priori.For before addressingmyself to experience, I already have in my conception all the requisite conditions for the judgement, and Ihave only to extract the predicate from the conception, according to the principle of contradiction, andthereby at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the judgement, a necessity which I could neverlearn from experience.On the other hand, though at first I do not at all include the predicate of weight in myconception of body in general, that conception still indicates an object of experience, a part of the totality ofexperience, to which I can still add other parts; and this I do when I recognize by observation that bodies areheavy.I can cognize beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the characteristics of extension,impenetrability, shape, etc., all which are cogitated in this conception.But now I extend my knowledge, andlooking back on experience from which I had derived this conception of body, I find weight at all timesconnected with the above characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions this as apredicate, and say, "All bodies are heavy." Thus it is experience upon which rests the possibility of thesynthesis of the predicate of weight with the conception of body, because both conceptions, although the oneis not contained in the other, still belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a whole,namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of intuitions.But to synthetical judgements a priori, such aid is entirely wanting [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]