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.However, it also reduces group decisiveness further.Actually, the double qualified majority rule does not favour the large memberstates.It hinders them from making a coalition and thus dominating the Union.The population rule that demands support of 62 percent of total population hasthe effect that no decision can be made without support from at least two of thefour large states, Germany, Britain, France and Italy.Table 6.5 shows that the probability of decisiveness will be sharply down inthe new Union and how restrictive the double qualified majority rule will beupon the future Union, as the probability of decisiveness is even lower.With sofew winning coalitions in the EU, positive decision-making will have to be basedupon common preferences.Only 2.2 percent of the possible coalitions would bewinning, meaning that commonalities in the preferences would have to lead theplayers toward the making of any of these few winning coalitions.The Dublin regime or the new EU Treaty 2007 outlines an alternative QMscheme, which changes the voting power parameters radically see Table 6.6.According to the new regime, the EU Council will vote qualitative but with asharp population requirement of 65 percent.In addition to QM there will alsobe double qualified majority.The power scores become more balanced withthe Dublin regime and better reflecting the population differences between themember states.Here, one may wish to consider Table 6.7, which shows how decisiveness hasbeen reduced up to the Dublin constitution, which increases group decisiveness,at least for the QM scheme.The Nice regime implies a real danger for deadlock and decision inertia.TheEU employs quantitative voting on a minor scale.Let us look at the unanimityvoting in the Security Council of the United Nations as well as the IMF thatemploys quantitative voting on a major scale. Logic of International Coordination 129Table 6.7 Decisiveness in the EU Council 1958 2009Year QM DQM1958 0.219 0.2031973 0.147 0.1371981 0.137 0.1151986 0.098 0.0931995 0.078 0.0702004 0.035 0.0262004 (NICE) 0.036 0.0222010 (NICE) 0.026 0.0172015 (LISBON) 0.109 0.006Quantitative VotingAs responsible for the stability of the currencies of the world, the IMF is anextremely powerful international organization.To whom is it accountable? TheIMF Board votes according to two schemes, both combining quantitative votingwith qualified majority.Table 6.8 shows the voting power scores for the keymember states under the two schemes.Voting power in the IMF is linked withfinancial contribution to the organization.It is the managers of the IMF wholends this money to governments in member states.Coordination in IMF securescomplete control to the member states that take the risks involved in the IMFlending through a highly skewed distribution of voting power in combinationwith an emphasis upon blocking power.The IMF can get things done, becausethe key players, the lending nations, have an almost complete control over thedecision-making in the mechanism.And the borrowing countries are dependentupon the support of the IMF.The outcome of heavy quantitative voting in combination a strong qualifiedmajority voting requirement is to provide for huge differences among the memberstates in voting power scores and in addition almost complete blocking powerfor the dominant members.The situation is the same for the IMF Board ofGovernors.Both boards face, however, the risks emanating from a low degreeof group decisiveness due to the high-qualified majority clause.One may wish topoint out that the World Bank is run according to a similar scheme.The WorldBank is basically a cooperative with the member states as shareholders.Thenumber of shares a country has is based roughly on the size of its economy.TheUS is the largest single shareholder, with 16.41 percent of votes, followed by Japan(7.87 percent), Germany (4.49 percent), the UK (4.31 percent) and France (4.31percent).The rest of the shares are divided among the other member countries.In the debate about governance and globalization, it has been stated that theIMF and the WB must be reformed so that the dominance of the occidentalsis reduced (Stiglitz, 2004).The best way to do this is simply to reduce the voting 130 Globalization The Juggernaut of the 21st CenturyTable 6.8 The IMF Executive BoardMembers Country votes 70% majority 85% majorityBanzhaf Capacity to Banzhaf Capacity toIndex block Index blockUnited States 371743 0.106 0.989 0.001 1.000Japan 133378 0.061 0.572 0.001 0.902Germany 130332 0.060 0.560 0.001 0.895France 107635 0.050 0.467 0.001 0.817United Kingdom 107635 0.050 0.467 0.001 0.817Belgium 111696 0.052 0.484 0.001 0.833Netherlands 105412 0.049 0.458 0.001 0.808Spain 92989 0.043 0.405 0.001 0.750Italy 90968 0.042 0.397 0.001 0.738Canada 80636 0.037 0.352 0.000 0.675Iceland 76276 0.035 0.334 0.000 0.647Australia 72423 0.034 0.317 0.000 0.622Saudi Arabia 70105 0.033 0.307 0.000 0.606Indonesia 69019 0.032 0.303 0.000 0.597Nigeria 69005 0.032 0.303 0.000 0.597Egypt 64008 0.030 0.281 0.000 0.563China 63942 0.030 0.280 0.000 0.562Switzerland 61827 0.029 0.271 0.000 0.547Russia 59704 0.028 0.262 0.000 0.534Brazil 53422 0.025 0.235 0.000 0.481Iran 53247 0.025 0.234 0.000 0.478India 52112 0.024 0.229 0.000 0.469Chile 43395 0.020 0.191 0.000 0.400Equatorial Guinea 30749 0.014 0.135 0.000 0.292Sum 2171658Decisiveness 0.053 0.0007disparities in the various boards, increasing the votes of Third World countries.The allocation of votes is based upon a formula that has not changed since thesetting up of the Bretton Woods institutions.The newly rich countries in Asia South Korea, Singapore and China are badly underrepresented, given the sizeof their economies [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.However, it also reduces group decisiveness further.Actually, the double qualified majority rule does not favour the large memberstates.It hinders them from making a coalition and thus dominating the Union.The population rule that demands support of 62 percent of total population hasthe effect that no decision can be made without support from at least two of thefour large states, Germany, Britain, France and Italy.Table 6.5 shows that the probability of decisiveness will be sharply down inthe new Union and how restrictive the double qualified majority rule will beupon the future Union, as the probability of decisiveness is even lower.With sofew winning coalitions in the EU, positive decision-making will have to be basedupon common preferences.Only 2.2 percent of the possible coalitions would bewinning, meaning that commonalities in the preferences would have to lead theplayers toward the making of any of these few winning coalitions.The Dublin regime or the new EU Treaty 2007 outlines an alternative QMscheme, which changes the voting power parameters radically see Table 6.6.According to the new regime, the EU Council will vote qualitative but with asharp population requirement of 65 percent.In addition to QM there will alsobe double qualified majority.The power scores become more balanced withthe Dublin regime and better reflecting the population differences between themember states.Here, one may wish to consider Table 6.7, which shows how decisiveness hasbeen reduced up to the Dublin constitution, which increases group decisiveness,at least for the QM scheme.The Nice regime implies a real danger for deadlock and decision inertia.TheEU employs quantitative voting on a minor scale.Let us look at the unanimityvoting in the Security Council of the United Nations as well as the IMF thatemploys quantitative voting on a major scale. Logic of International Coordination 129Table 6.7 Decisiveness in the EU Council 1958 2009Year QM DQM1958 0.219 0.2031973 0.147 0.1371981 0.137 0.1151986 0.098 0.0931995 0.078 0.0702004 0.035 0.0262004 (NICE) 0.036 0.0222010 (NICE) 0.026 0.0172015 (LISBON) 0.109 0.006Quantitative VotingAs responsible for the stability of the currencies of the world, the IMF is anextremely powerful international organization.To whom is it accountable? TheIMF Board votes according to two schemes, both combining quantitative votingwith qualified majority.Table 6.8 shows the voting power scores for the keymember states under the two schemes.Voting power in the IMF is linked withfinancial contribution to the organization.It is the managers of the IMF wholends this money to governments in member states.Coordination in IMF securescomplete control to the member states that take the risks involved in the IMFlending through a highly skewed distribution of voting power in combinationwith an emphasis upon blocking power.The IMF can get things done, becausethe key players, the lending nations, have an almost complete control over thedecision-making in the mechanism.And the borrowing countries are dependentupon the support of the IMF.The outcome of heavy quantitative voting in combination a strong qualifiedmajority voting requirement is to provide for huge differences among the memberstates in voting power scores and in addition almost complete blocking powerfor the dominant members.The situation is the same for the IMF Board ofGovernors.Both boards face, however, the risks emanating from a low degreeof group decisiveness due to the high-qualified majority clause.One may wish topoint out that the World Bank is run according to a similar scheme.The WorldBank is basically a cooperative with the member states as shareholders.Thenumber of shares a country has is based roughly on the size of its economy.TheUS is the largest single shareholder, with 16.41 percent of votes, followed by Japan(7.87 percent), Germany (4.49 percent), the UK (4.31 percent) and France (4.31percent).The rest of the shares are divided among the other member countries.In the debate about governance and globalization, it has been stated that theIMF and the WB must be reformed so that the dominance of the occidentalsis reduced (Stiglitz, 2004).The best way to do this is simply to reduce the voting 130 Globalization The Juggernaut of the 21st CenturyTable 6.8 The IMF Executive BoardMembers Country votes 70% majority 85% majorityBanzhaf Capacity to Banzhaf Capacity toIndex block Index blockUnited States 371743 0.106 0.989 0.001 1.000Japan 133378 0.061 0.572 0.001 0.902Germany 130332 0.060 0.560 0.001 0.895France 107635 0.050 0.467 0.001 0.817United Kingdom 107635 0.050 0.467 0.001 0.817Belgium 111696 0.052 0.484 0.001 0.833Netherlands 105412 0.049 0.458 0.001 0.808Spain 92989 0.043 0.405 0.001 0.750Italy 90968 0.042 0.397 0.001 0.738Canada 80636 0.037 0.352 0.000 0.675Iceland 76276 0.035 0.334 0.000 0.647Australia 72423 0.034 0.317 0.000 0.622Saudi Arabia 70105 0.033 0.307 0.000 0.606Indonesia 69019 0.032 0.303 0.000 0.597Nigeria 69005 0.032 0.303 0.000 0.597Egypt 64008 0.030 0.281 0.000 0.563China 63942 0.030 0.280 0.000 0.562Switzerland 61827 0.029 0.271 0.000 0.547Russia 59704 0.028 0.262 0.000 0.534Brazil 53422 0.025 0.235 0.000 0.481Iran 53247 0.025 0.234 0.000 0.478India 52112 0.024 0.229 0.000 0.469Chile 43395 0.020 0.191 0.000 0.400Equatorial Guinea 30749 0.014 0.135 0.000 0.292Sum 2171658Decisiveness 0.053 0.0007disparities in the various boards, increasing the votes of Third World countries.The allocation of votes is based upon a formula that has not changed since thesetting up of the Bretton Woods institutions.The newly rich countries in Asia South Korea, Singapore and China are badly underrepresented, given the sizeof their economies [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]