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.In the hopes of capturing Arnold,Lafayette had been sent to Virginia with a nucleus of twelve hundred troops, and on the evening of the 8th ofMarch the French squadron at Newport sailed, in concerted movement, to control the waters of the bay.Admiral Arbuthnot, commanding the English fleet lying in Gardiner's Bay, (1) learned the departure by hislookouts, and started in pursuit on the morning of the 10th, thirty-six hours later.Favored either by diligenceor luck, he made such good time that when the two fleets came in sight of each other, a little outside of theCHAPTER X.MARITIME WAR IN NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1778-1781. ITS INFLUENCE U173 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783capes of the Chesapeake, the English were leading.(2) They at once went about to meet their enemy, who, onhis part, formed a line-of-battle.The wind at this the was west, so that neither could head directly into thebay. 1.At the eastern end of Long Island.2.The French ascribe this disadvantage to the fact that some oftheir ships were not coppered. The two fleets were nearly equal in strength, there being eight ships on each side; but the English had oneninety-gun ship, while of the French one was only a heavy frigate, which was put into the line.Nevertheless,the case was eminently one for the general French policy to have determined the action of a vigorous chief,and the failure to see the matter through must fall upon the good-will of Commodore Destouches, or uponsome other cause than that preference for the ulterior objects of the operations, of which the reader of Frenchnaval history hears so much.The weather was boisterous and threatening, and the wind, after hauling once ortwice, settled down to northeast, with a big sea, but was then fair for entering the bay.The two fleets were bythis time both on the port tack standing out to sea, the French leading, and about a point on the weather bowof the English.From this position they wore in succession ahead of the latter, taking the lee-gage, and thusgaining the use of their lower batteries, which the heavy sea forbade to the weather-gage.The English stoodon till abreast the enemy's line, when they wore together, and soon after attacked in the usual manner, andwith the usual results.The three van ships were very badly injured aloft, but in their turn, throwing their forcemainly on the two leaders of the enemy, crippled them seriously in hulls and rigging.The French van thenkept away, and Arbuthnot, in perplexity, ordered his van to haul the wind again.M.Destouches now executeda very neat movement by defiling.Signalling his van to haul up on the other tack, he led the rest of hissquadron by the disabled English ships, and after giving them the successive broadsides of his comparativelyfresh ships, wore, and out to sea.This was the end of the battle, in which the English certainly got the worst;but with their usual tenacity of purpose, being unable to pursue their enemy afloat, they steered for the bay,made the junction with Arnold, and thus broke up the plans of the French and Americans, from which somuch had been hoped by Washington.There can be no doubt, after careful reading of the accounts, that afterthe fighting the French were in better force than the English, and they in fact claimed the victory; yet theulterior objects of the expedition did not tempt them again to try the issue with a fleet of about their own size.(1) 1.That the French government was not satisfied with M.Destouches's action can be safely inferred fromits delay to reward the officers of the squadron, which called forth much feeling and very livelyremonstrances.The French asserted that Arbuthnot was hooted in the streets of New York and recalled by hisgovernment.The latter is a mistake, as he went home by his own request but the former is likely enough.Bothcommanders reversed in this case the usual naval policy of their nations. The way of the sea being thus open and held in force, two thousand more English troops sailing from NewYork reached Virginia on the 26th of March, and the subsequent arrival of Cornwallis in May raised thenumber to seven thousand.The operations of the contending forces during the spring and summer months, inwhich Lafayette commanded the Americans, do not concern our subject.Early in August, Cornwallis, actingunder orders from Clinton, withdrew his troops into the peninsula between the York and James rivers, andoccupied Yorktown.Washington and Rochambeau had met on the 21st of Mar, and decided that the situation demanded that theeffort of the French West Indian fleet, when it came, should be directed against either New York or theChesapeake.This was the tenor of the despatch found by De Grasse at Cap Francais, and meantime the alliedgenerals drew their troops toward New York, where they would be on hand for the furtherance of one object,and nearer the second if they had to make for it.In either case the result, in the opinion both of Washingtonand of the French government, depended upon superior sea power; but Rochambeau had privately notified theadmiral that his own preference was for the Chesapeake as the scene of the intended operations, and moreoverCHAPTER X.MARITIME WAR IN NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1778-1781. ITS INFLUENCE U174 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783the French government had declined to furnish the means for a formal siege of New York.(1) The enterprisetherefore assumed the form of an extensive military combination, dependent upon ease and rapidity ofmovement, and upon blinding the eyes of the enemy to the real objective, purposes to which the peculiarqualities of a navy admirably lent themselves.The shorter distance to be traversed, the greater depth of waterand easier pilotage of the Chesapeake, were further reasons which would commend the scheme to thejudgment of a seaman; and De Grasse readily accepted it, without making difficulties or demandingmodifications which would have involved discussion and delay. 1.Bancroft: History of the United States. Having made his decision, the French admiral acted with great good judgment, promptitude, and vigor.Thesame frigate that brought despatches from Washington was sent back, so that by August 15th the alliedgenerals knew of the intended coming of the fleet.Thirty-five hundred soldiers were spared by the governorof Cap Francais, upon the condition of a Spanish squadron anchoring at the place, which De Grasse procured.He also raised from the governor of Havana the money urgently needed by the Americans; and finally, insteadof weakening his force by sending convoys to France, as the court had wished, he took every available ship tothe Chesapeake.To conceal his coming as long as possible, he passed through the Bahama Channel, as a lessfrequented route, and on the 30th of August anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just within the capes of theChesapeake, with twenty-eight ships-of-the-line.Three days before, August 27, the French squadron atNewport, eight ships-of-the- line with four frigates and eighteen transports under M.de Barras, sailed for therendezvous; making, however, a wide circuit out to sea to avoid the English.This course was the morenecessary as the French siege-artillery was with it.The troops under Washington and Rochambeau hadcrossed the Hudson on the 24th of August, moving toward the head of Chesapeake Bay.Thus the differentarmed forces, both land and sea, were converging toward their objective, Cornwallis.The English were unfortunate in all directions.Rodney, learning of De Grasse's departure, sent fourteenships-of-the-line under Admiral Hood to North America, and himself sailed for England in August, onaccount of ill health [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.In the hopes of capturing Arnold,Lafayette had been sent to Virginia with a nucleus of twelve hundred troops, and on the evening of the 8th ofMarch the French squadron at Newport sailed, in concerted movement, to control the waters of the bay.Admiral Arbuthnot, commanding the English fleet lying in Gardiner's Bay, (1) learned the departure by hislookouts, and started in pursuit on the morning of the 10th, thirty-six hours later.Favored either by diligenceor luck, he made such good time that when the two fleets came in sight of each other, a little outside of theCHAPTER X.MARITIME WAR IN NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1778-1781. ITS INFLUENCE U173 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783capes of the Chesapeake, the English were leading.(2) They at once went about to meet their enemy, who, onhis part, formed a line-of-battle.The wind at this the was west, so that neither could head directly into thebay. 1.At the eastern end of Long Island.2.The French ascribe this disadvantage to the fact that some oftheir ships were not coppered. The two fleets were nearly equal in strength, there being eight ships on each side; but the English had oneninety-gun ship, while of the French one was only a heavy frigate, which was put into the line.Nevertheless,the case was eminently one for the general French policy to have determined the action of a vigorous chief,and the failure to see the matter through must fall upon the good-will of Commodore Destouches, or uponsome other cause than that preference for the ulterior objects of the operations, of which the reader of Frenchnaval history hears so much.The weather was boisterous and threatening, and the wind, after hauling once ortwice, settled down to northeast, with a big sea, but was then fair for entering the bay.The two fleets were bythis time both on the port tack standing out to sea, the French leading, and about a point on the weather bowof the English.From this position they wore in succession ahead of the latter, taking the lee-gage, and thusgaining the use of their lower batteries, which the heavy sea forbade to the weather-gage.The English stoodon till abreast the enemy's line, when they wore together, and soon after attacked in the usual manner, andwith the usual results.The three van ships were very badly injured aloft, but in their turn, throwing their forcemainly on the two leaders of the enemy, crippled them seriously in hulls and rigging.The French van thenkept away, and Arbuthnot, in perplexity, ordered his van to haul the wind again.M.Destouches now executeda very neat movement by defiling.Signalling his van to haul up on the other tack, he led the rest of hissquadron by the disabled English ships, and after giving them the successive broadsides of his comparativelyfresh ships, wore, and out to sea.This was the end of the battle, in which the English certainly got the worst;but with their usual tenacity of purpose, being unable to pursue their enemy afloat, they steered for the bay,made the junction with Arnold, and thus broke up the plans of the French and Americans, from which somuch had been hoped by Washington.There can be no doubt, after careful reading of the accounts, that afterthe fighting the French were in better force than the English, and they in fact claimed the victory; yet theulterior objects of the expedition did not tempt them again to try the issue with a fleet of about their own size.(1) 1.That the French government was not satisfied with M.Destouches's action can be safely inferred fromits delay to reward the officers of the squadron, which called forth much feeling and very livelyremonstrances.The French asserted that Arbuthnot was hooted in the streets of New York and recalled by hisgovernment.The latter is a mistake, as he went home by his own request but the former is likely enough.Bothcommanders reversed in this case the usual naval policy of their nations. The way of the sea being thus open and held in force, two thousand more English troops sailing from NewYork reached Virginia on the 26th of March, and the subsequent arrival of Cornwallis in May raised thenumber to seven thousand.The operations of the contending forces during the spring and summer months, inwhich Lafayette commanded the Americans, do not concern our subject.Early in August, Cornwallis, actingunder orders from Clinton, withdrew his troops into the peninsula between the York and James rivers, andoccupied Yorktown.Washington and Rochambeau had met on the 21st of Mar, and decided that the situation demanded that theeffort of the French West Indian fleet, when it came, should be directed against either New York or theChesapeake.This was the tenor of the despatch found by De Grasse at Cap Francais, and meantime the alliedgenerals drew their troops toward New York, where they would be on hand for the furtherance of one object,and nearer the second if they had to make for it.In either case the result, in the opinion both of Washingtonand of the French government, depended upon superior sea power; but Rochambeau had privately notified theadmiral that his own preference was for the Chesapeake as the scene of the intended operations, and moreoverCHAPTER X.MARITIME WAR IN NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1778-1781. ITS INFLUENCE U174 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783the French government had declined to furnish the means for a formal siege of New York.(1) The enterprisetherefore assumed the form of an extensive military combination, dependent upon ease and rapidity ofmovement, and upon blinding the eyes of the enemy to the real objective, purposes to which the peculiarqualities of a navy admirably lent themselves.The shorter distance to be traversed, the greater depth of waterand easier pilotage of the Chesapeake, were further reasons which would commend the scheme to thejudgment of a seaman; and De Grasse readily accepted it, without making difficulties or demandingmodifications which would have involved discussion and delay. 1.Bancroft: History of the United States. Having made his decision, the French admiral acted with great good judgment, promptitude, and vigor.Thesame frigate that brought despatches from Washington was sent back, so that by August 15th the alliedgenerals knew of the intended coming of the fleet.Thirty-five hundred soldiers were spared by the governorof Cap Francais, upon the condition of a Spanish squadron anchoring at the place, which De Grasse procured.He also raised from the governor of Havana the money urgently needed by the Americans; and finally, insteadof weakening his force by sending convoys to France, as the court had wished, he took every available ship tothe Chesapeake.To conceal his coming as long as possible, he passed through the Bahama Channel, as a lessfrequented route, and on the 30th of August anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just within the capes of theChesapeake, with twenty-eight ships-of-the-line.Three days before, August 27, the French squadron atNewport, eight ships-of-the- line with four frigates and eighteen transports under M.de Barras, sailed for therendezvous; making, however, a wide circuit out to sea to avoid the English.This course was the morenecessary as the French siege-artillery was with it.The troops under Washington and Rochambeau hadcrossed the Hudson on the 24th of August, moving toward the head of Chesapeake Bay.Thus the differentarmed forces, both land and sea, were converging toward their objective, Cornwallis.The English were unfortunate in all directions.Rodney, learning of De Grasse's departure, sent fourteenships-of-the-line under Admiral Hood to North America, and himself sailed for England in August, onaccount of ill health [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]