[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.Later additions included AndreiZhdanov, who ran Leningrad and its big weapon factories; Lavrentii Beriia,chief of secret police and labor camps, who oversaw the development of newmilitary technologies from radar to the atom bomb; Georgii Malenkov, wholater took over the party apparatus and picked up an important role in thedevelopment of Soviet aerospace; Nikolai Voznesenskii, who ran the wareconomy; and Nikita Khrushchev, who would denounce Stalin after the lat-ter s death.As a principal who valued vertical obedience and truth-telling, and desiredhis agents to engage in only horizontal transactions that he had authorized, 56 Mark Harrison & Andrei MarkevichFigure 3.1.Vertical and Horizontal RelationsStalin disliked it when his subordinates stood up for each other and favoredthose that were frank with him and did not cover for others.Thus he lost faithin Ordzhonikidze when the latter tried to protect his officials from the purges,and promoted Voznesenskii, whom the others disliked as the Boss s pet.Later,however, when Malenkov and Beriia caused Stalin to doubt Voznesenskii sloyalty, Stalin had him shot (Khlevniuk 1993; Gorlizki and Khlevnyuk 2004).In the field of defense economics the first formal link in the transmissionbelt from Stalin and the Politburo to the ministries was provided by a high-level subcommittee of the party, the government, or sometimes both jointly.The succession is shown in Figure 3.2: in the 1920s a defense commission ofthe Politburo, then of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO); from 1930 to1937 a joint party-government Defense Commission, and from 1937 to WorldWar II a government Defense Committee; while Stalin himself tended to be an ordinary member of these subcommittees, they were always chaired bysomeone close to him such as Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, or Voznesenskii.InWorld War II everything was done directly from Stalin s war cabinet, the StateDefense Committee.After the war things became less formal but the principleremained the same: a few people stood between Stalin and the governmentand processed his instructions in a small group before passing them on to theministries.THE CHAIN OF COMMANDStalin s orders went via the government, called the Council of People sCommissars from 1917 and renamed the Council of Ministers in 1946, ordirectly to individual commissars.The People s Commissars were governmentministers who ran not only the usual departments for home and foreign af-fairs, defense, finance, education, and so on but also a wide range of ministries Hierarchies and Markets 57Figure 3.2.Stalin s Defense Subcommitteefor production and distribution.The production and distribution ministrieswere the result of a state-owned economy; these ministries exercised the own-ership rights over the means of production and distribution on behalf of thestate.At this general level there were no fundamental differences in the waythe defense industry was owned and managed from that applied to civilianbranches.The general pattern of organization of a Soviet ministry is shown in Figure3.3.There were three main levels: at the bottom were the direct producersorganized in state-owned enterprises.The enterprises were grouped in togetherin larger associations.In the 1920s these tended to be called trusts in the spirit 58 Mark Harrison & Andrei MarkevichFigure 3.3.Minister, Chief Administration, and Enterpriseof capitalist holding companies, and the trusts had names that conveyed thesense of what they produced for example, the Gun and Arsenal Trust, orthe Military Chemicals Trust. Under Stalin the trusts lost even the fiction ofoperational independence that they had had in the 1920s and tended to bereplaced by ministerial departments usually called chief administrations. Finally, the heads of chief administrations reported directly to the minister,with whom they belonged to the ministerial collegium or council; the moreimportant heads of administrations had the status of deputy ministers.In practice the ministerial organization chart could be still more or lesscomplex than that shown.Exceptionally large or important establishmentscould be kept under the personal supervision of the minister, bypassing thechief administration.At the other extreme particularly small-scale or other-wise negligible outfits could be lumped together into a trust, and such trustscould be agglomerated into associations that reported to a chief administra-tion.In practice, therefore, the number of links in the transmission belt fromthe minister to the firm could range from one for the biggest factories to threeor four for the least in size.But the general trend of the 1930s, as we shall see,was in the direction of simpler, shallower hierarchies with fewer levels.Table 3.2 provides a snapshot of the structure of the defense industry in1936, when the industry became important enough to have its own ministry Hierarchies and Markets 59for the first time.At this time it comprised 274 separate establishments orga-nized in eleven chief administrations and trusts; later the chief administrationswere numbered rather than given names.The factories were highly diverse,ranging from large-scale mass production facilities for guns and ammunitionto much smaller workshops in which artisans crafted aircraft out of wood andcanvas; there were also research and experimental facilities, firing ranges,training colleges, and so forth.In the 1920s the ministerial structure was relatively simple: there was asingle ministry for state-owned industry, grandly called the Supreme Councilof the National Economy (VSNKh).Other ministries controlled foreign trade,transport, and the channeling of food from the countryside to the towns.Withrapid industrialization under the five-year plans this simple structure soonbecame more complex.In 1930 the food industry was carved out of VSNKh;in 1932 what remained of VSNKh was split into separate ministries for theheavy and light industries.Further subdivisions came in the second half of the1930s.In December 1936 a separate ministry was created for the defenseindustry; two years later, in January 1939, the defense industry was shared outamong four new ministries for the aircraft, armament, ammunition, and ship-building industries.These ministries did not cover the whole of specializedwar production, however.A ministry of engineering, hived off from heavyindustry in 1937, continued to deal with things like armored vehicles andmortar armament.In September 1941, however, new ministries were set up tospecialize in tank and mortar production for the duration of the war.After the war, completely new industries were created for the new atomic,missile, and radar technologies.Long-range ballistic missiles were absorbedby the ministry of armament, but atomic weapons and radar were managed bytemporary high-level government commissions until after Stalin s death, whenthey were handed over to new ministries of the radiotechnical industry andmedium engineering [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl przylepto3.keep.pl
.Later additions included AndreiZhdanov, who ran Leningrad and its big weapon factories; Lavrentii Beriia,chief of secret police and labor camps, who oversaw the development of newmilitary technologies from radar to the atom bomb; Georgii Malenkov, wholater took over the party apparatus and picked up an important role in thedevelopment of Soviet aerospace; Nikolai Voznesenskii, who ran the wareconomy; and Nikita Khrushchev, who would denounce Stalin after the lat-ter s death.As a principal who valued vertical obedience and truth-telling, and desiredhis agents to engage in only horizontal transactions that he had authorized, 56 Mark Harrison & Andrei MarkevichFigure 3.1.Vertical and Horizontal RelationsStalin disliked it when his subordinates stood up for each other and favoredthose that were frank with him and did not cover for others.Thus he lost faithin Ordzhonikidze when the latter tried to protect his officials from the purges,and promoted Voznesenskii, whom the others disliked as the Boss s pet.Later,however, when Malenkov and Beriia caused Stalin to doubt Voznesenskii sloyalty, Stalin had him shot (Khlevniuk 1993; Gorlizki and Khlevnyuk 2004).In the field of defense economics the first formal link in the transmissionbelt from Stalin and the Politburo to the ministries was provided by a high-level subcommittee of the party, the government, or sometimes both jointly.The succession is shown in Figure 3.2: in the 1920s a defense commission ofthe Politburo, then of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO); from 1930 to1937 a joint party-government Defense Commission, and from 1937 to WorldWar II a government Defense Committee; while Stalin himself tended to be an ordinary member of these subcommittees, they were always chaired bysomeone close to him such as Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, or Voznesenskii.InWorld War II everything was done directly from Stalin s war cabinet, the StateDefense Committee.After the war things became less formal but the principleremained the same: a few people stood between Stalin and the governmentand processed his instructions in a small group before passing them on to theministries.THE CHAIN OF COMMANDStalin s orders went via the government, called the Council of People sCommissars from 1917 and renamed the Council of Ministers in 1946, ordirectly to individual commissars.The People s Commissars were governmentministers who ran not only the usual departments for home and foreign af-fairs, defense, finance, education, and so on but also a wide range of ministries Hierarchies and Markets 57Figure 3.2.Stalin s Defense Subcommitteefor production and distribution.The production and distribution ministrieswere the result of a state-owned economy; these ministries exercised the own-ership rights over the means of production and distribution on behalf of thestate.At this general level there were no fundamental differences in the waythe defense industry was owned and managed from that applied to civilianbranches.The general pattern of organization of a Soviet ministry is shown in Figure3.3.There were three main levels: at the bottom were the direct producersorganized in state-owned enterprises.The enterprises were grouped in togetherin larger associations.In the 1920s these tended to be called trusts in the spirit 58 Mark Harrison & Andrei MarkevichFigure 3.3.Minister, Chief Administration, and Enterpriseof capitalist holding companies, and the trusts had names that conveyed thesense of what they produced for example, the Gun and Arsenal Trust, orthe Military Chemicals Trust. Under Stalin the trusts lost even the fiction ofoperational independence that they had had in the 1920s and tended to bereplaced by ministerial departments usually called chief administrations. Finally, the heads of chief administrations reported directly to the minister,with whom they belonged to the ministerial collegium or council; the moreimportant heads of administrations had the status of deputy ministers.In practice the ministerial organization chart could be still more or lesscomplex than that shown.Exceptionally large or important establishmentscould be kept under the personal supervision of the minister, bypassing thechief administration.At the other extreme particularly small-scale or other-wise negligible outfits could be lumped together into a trust, and such trustscould be agglomerated into associations that reported to a chief administra-tion.In practice, therefore, the number of links in the transmission belt fromthe minister to the firm could range from one for the biggest factories to threeor four for the least in size.But the general trend of the 1930s, as we shall see,was in the direction of simpler, shallower hierarchies with fewer levels.Table 3.2 provides a snapshot of the structure of the defense industry in1936, when the industry became important enough to have its own ministry Hierarchies and Markets 59for the first time.At this time it comprised 274 separate establishments orga-nized in eleven chief administrations and trusts; later the chief administrationswere numbered rather than given names.The factories were highly diverse,ranging from large-scale mass production facilities for guns and ammunitionto much smaller workshops in which artisans crafted aircraft out of wood andcanvas; there were also research and experimental facilities, firing ranges,training colleges, and so forth.In the 1920s the ministerial structure was relatively simple: there was asingle ministry for state-owned industry, grandly called the Supreme Councilof the National Economy (VSNKh).Other ministries controlled foreign trade,transport, and the channeling of food from the countryside to the towns.Withrapid industrialization under the five-year plans this simple structure soonbecame more complex.In 1930 the food industry was carved out of VSNKh;in 1932 what remained of VSNKh was split into separate ministries for theheavy and light industries.Further subdivisions came in the second half of the1930s.In December 1936 a separate ministry was created for the defenseindustry; two years later, in January 1939, the defense industry was shared outamong four new ministries for the aircraft, armament, ammunition, and ship-building industries.These ministries did not cover the whole of specializedwar production, however.A ministry of engineering, hived off from heavyindustry in 1937, continued to deal with things like armored vehicles andmortar armament.In September 1941, however, new ministries were set up tospecialize in tank and mortar production for the duration of the war.After the war, completely new industries were created for the new atomic,missile, and radar technologies.Long-range ballistic missiles were absorbedby the ministry of armament, but atomic weapons and radar were managed bytemporary high-level government commissions until after Stalin s death, whenthey were handed over to new ministries of the radiotechnical industry andmedium engineering [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]