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. 20 However, General Roseintervened, asserted his rights as the responsible commander,and designated a new target for the attack, which turned outto be a derelict tank destroyer.21 NATO launched over a dozenFrench, British, and Dutch aircraft, but after long delays andproblems with weather, two US A-10s under the control of aFrench forward air controller made the attack.22 NATO s first air strike involved no bombs.The A-10s made several straf-ing passes on the vehicle, which was miles from Ilidza andwhich AFSOUTH airmen only later realized had already beenout of commission.23 Throughout the attack, the UN com-manders held tight control over events.While General Rosecoordinated with General Chambers on which target to hit,24General de Lapresle held one phone to Chambers s NATOsuperiors in one hand, and in the other he held a phonethrough which he issued demands to Momcilo Krajisnik, pres-ident of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.25 The Serbs agreed toreturn the weapons after the attack on the broken down vehi-cle, and General Rose later rejected notions that this was a pin prick strike, stating: This air strike by NATO proved atextbook example of the precise use of force in a peacekeepingmission. 26 Admiral Smith had a different view:I was frustrated as hell when Michael Rose would give us one target,and drop the bomb, and that was it.And I tried my damndest to gethim to understand that you ve got to do more than go after somederelict tank in the middle of a field.27The underlying problem was that the two commanders werepursuing different missions.The UN general was practicingpeacekeeping, and the NATO admiral was attempting toenforce UN mandates and NATO ultimatums.28WarningsCompounding Admiral Smith s frustration over having theattack directed against a disused vehicle was his discovery163 RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDthat General Rose had given the Serbs a warning before the airstrike.29 While most observers appreciated the risks faced bypeacekeepers in Bosnia, a continual point of frustration forsenior NATO airmen was that few, if any, commentatorsseemed to recognize the dangers confronting NATO aircrews.30General Rose believed warning the Bosnian Serbs was neces-sary for limiting collateral damage, and that it was consistentwith the peacekeeping principles of maintaining consent andthe minimum use of force.31 Moreover, the warnings mini-mized the chances of Bosnian Serb retaliation against Rose speacekeepers.For Admiral Smith, warnings created an unjus-tifiable risk to the lives of NATO aircrews, and he became furi-ous with General Rose over the issue.32 Despite the admiral sremonstrations, though, General Rose would ignore Smith sconcerns and continue to warn the Serbs.33The warnings helped General Rose to lower the risks to hisforces.UNPROFOR did not just warn the Serbs in general thatthey were about to be attacked but told them specifically whatwould be attacked just prior to each strike.34 The practice ofgiving the Serbs warning served the needs of the UN missionin Bosnia and was intended to head off Bosnian Serb retalia-tion against UNPROFOR peacekeepers.By warning theBosnian Serbs of NATO air attacks, UN commanders reducedthe chances of killing any BSA soldiers, thus helping to main-tain the consent of the Serbs for the UN s presence and itsmission in Bosnia.This, in turn, reduced Serb motivations totake revenge against UNPROFOR forces.Therefore, tacticalwarnings prior to air strikes helped to maximize both missionsuccess and force protection for UNPROFOR.General Roseconsidered warnings a principle of peacekeeping,35 and hecontinued to issue warnings despite Admiral Smith s strenu-ous protests.36 Recounting a discussion with Admiral Smith,General Rose recalled,He [Admiral Smith] said: If you issue a warning, you re hazarding mypilots. And I would say: Sure there is a risk to your pilots, becausethey re coming down quite low to deliver their ordnance, and theseguys could be ready for them.But the fact is they re only coming intothe theater of operations for minutes at a time. I said: We live, youknow, within the range of these weapons all the time, so what s the164 COMPETING MISSIONS AND DEMANDS FOR FORCE PROTECTIONproblem? What s the big deal? When you re a peacekeeper you oughtto take risks [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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. 20 However, General Roseintervened, asserted his rights as the responsible commander,and designated a new target for the attack, which turned outto be a derelict tank destroyer.21 NATO launched over a dozenFrench, British, and Dutch aircraft, but after long delays andproblems with weather, two US A-10s under the control of aFrench forward air controller made the attack.22 NATO s first air strike involved no bombs.The A-10s made several straf-ing passes on the vehicle, which was miles from Ilidza andwhich AFSOUTH airmen only later realized had already beenout of commission.23 Throughout the attack, the UN com-manders held tight control over events.While General Rosecoordinated with General Chambers on which target to hit,24General de Lapresle held one phone to Chambers s NATOsuperiors in one hand, and in the other he held a phonethrough which he issued demands to Momcilo Krajisnik, pres-ident of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.25 The Serbs agreed toreturn the weapons after the attack on the broken down vehi-cle, and General Rose later rejected notions that this was a pin prick strike, stating: This air strike by NATO proved atextbook example of the precise use of force in a peacekeepingmission. 26 Admiral Smith had a different view:I was frustrated as hell when Michael Rose would give us one target,and drop the bomb, and that was it.And I tried my damndest to gethim to understand that you ve got to do more than go after somederelict tank in the middle of a field.27The underlying problem was that the two commanders werepursuing different missions.The UN general was practicingpeacekeeping, and the NATO admiral was attempting toenforce UN mandates and NATO ultimatums.28WarningsCompounding Admiral Smith s frustration over having theattack directed against a disused vehicle was his discovery163 RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDthat General Rose had given the Serbs a warning before the airstrike.29 While most observers appreciated the risks faced bypeacekeepers in Bosnia, a continual point of frustration forsenior NATO airmen was that few, if any, commentatorsseemed to recognize the dangers confronting NATO aircrews.30General Rose believed warning the Bosnian Serbs was neces-sary for limiting collateral damage, and that it was consistentwith the peacekeeping principles of maintaining consent andthe minimum use of force.31 Moreover, the warnings mini-mized the chances of Bosnian Serb retaliation against Rose speacekeepers.For Admiral Smith, warnings created an unjus-tifiable risk to the lives of NATO aircrews, and he became furi-ous with General Rose over the issue.32 Despite the admiral sremonstrations, though, General Rose would ignore Smith sconcerns and continue to warn the Serbs.33The warnings helped General Rose to lower the risks to hisforces.UNPROFOR did not just warn the Serbs in general thatthey were about to be attacked but told them specifically whatwould be attacked just prior to each strike.34 The practice ofgiving the Serbs warning served the needs of the UN missionin Bosnia and was intended to head off Bosnian Serb retalia-tion against UNPROFOR peacekeepers.By warning theBosnian Serbs of NATO air attacks, UN commanders reducedthe chances of killing any BSA soldiers, thus helping to main-tain the consent of the Serbs for the UN s presence and itsmission in Bosnia.This, in turn, reduced Serb motivations totake revenge against UNPROFOR forces.Therefore, tacticalwarnings prior to air strikes helped to maximize both missionsuccess and force protection for UNPROFOR.General Roseconsidered warnings a principle of peacekeeping,35 and hecontinued to issue warnings despite Admiral Smith s strenu-ous protests.36 Recounting a discussion with Admiral Smith,General Rose recalled,He [Admiral Smith] said: If you issue a warning, you re hazarding mypilots. And I would say: Sure there is a risk to your pilots, becausethey re coming down quite low to deliver their ordnance, and theseguys could be ready for them.But the fact is they re only coming intothe theater of operations for minutes at a time. I said: We live, youknow, within the range of these weapons all the time, so what s the164 COMPETING MISSIONS AND DEMANDS FOR FORCE PROTECTIONproblem? What s the big deal? When you re a peacekeeper you oughtto take risks [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]