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.(The author was a frequent visitor toManila and Saigon from 1952 through 1954 as the commanding officer ofa Military Air Transport Service squadron which provided much of themilitary airlift between those cities in those days, and on more than oneflight carried as special passengers members of the Lansdale team, bothU.S.and Filipino personnel, to and from Saigon).These plans, which were made for the development of a UnitedStates presence in Vietnam to replace the French after their defeat at DienBien Phu and to create a new leader to replace the French puppet, BaoDai, had been primarily developed by the operational CIA, almost as anatural follow-on of their production of Magsaysay.Ngo Dinh Diem was a selection and creation of the CIA, as well asothers such as Admiral Arthur Radford and Cardinal Spellman, but theprimary role in the early creation of the "father of his country" image forNgo Dinh Diem was played by the CIA -- and Edward G.Lansdale wasthe man upon whom this responsibility fell.He became such a firmsupporter of Diem that when he visited Diem just after Kennedy's electionhe carried with him a gift "from the U.S.Government", a huge desk setwith a brass plate across its base reading, "To Ngo Dinh Diem, The Fatherof His Country." The presentation of that gift to Diem by Lansdale markednearly seven years of close personal and official relationship, all under thesponsorship of the CIA.It was the CIA that created Diem's first elite bodyguard to keep himalive in those early and precarious days.It was the CIA that created theSpecial Forces of Vietnamese troops, which were under the tight controlof Ngo Dinh Nhu, and it was the CIA that created and directed the tens ofthousands of paramilitary forces of all kinds in South Vietnam duringthose difficult years of the Diem regime.Not until the U.S.Marineslanded in South Vietnam, in the van of the escalation in 1964, did anelement of American troops arrive in Vietnam that were not under theoperational control of the CIA.From 1945 through the crucial years of 1954 and 1955 and on to1964, almost everything that was done in South Vietnam, including even astrong role in the selection of generals and ambassadors, was the action ofthe CIA, with the DOD playing a supporting role and the Department ofState almost in total eclipse.Thus, when The New York Times asks, "Whydid the policy makers go ahead despite the intelligence estimates preparedby their most senior intelligence officials?" it has asked an excellentquestion, because it must include in the "most senior intelligence officials"the Director of Central Intelligence and others of the Agency.This makesone wonder at what point a man like Allen Dulles stops playing the role ofintelligence official and sees himself in the mirror as CIA clandestinecommander in chief. These examples have to make certain aspects of the release andpublication of the Pentagon Papers deeply suspect, especially since theman who says he released these vast volumes to the newspapers, DanielEllsberg, was ideally suited for this role by virtue of his Vietnamexperience with the very same Edward G.Lansdale.No matter what onemight wish to believe the intentions of Ellsberg were when he did this, itwould be most difficult to accept that he of all people did not know all thefacts.And if he did know all of the facts I have described, why did hewant to make it appear that it was Pentagon policymakers who went ahead"despite the intelligence estimates prepared by their most seniorintelligence officials"? Why has so much care been taken to make itappear that these are papers from the Pentagon that he has dumped on thenews media's doorstep? Why has no one made the proper distinction thatthe majority of these documents were not really Pentagon originated at all,but were originated in, among other places, the CIA (Covert side)?Certainly if his facts, as well as those presented by The New York Times,are right, the CIA (Covert side) was in a much better position to heed itsown CIA (Intelligence side) warnings and advice than any otherdepartment or agency in Washington.The answer to these questions becomes obvious.The CIA uses itsintelligence role as a cover mechanism for its operational activities.Furthermore it uses its own secret intelligence as an initiator for its ownsecret operations.This is what pleased General Donovan when PresidentRoosevelt unleashed him with the OSS and it is what has been the drivingforce behind the hard core operational agents within the intelligencecommunity since that time.Allen Dulles himself helps us to define General Donovan's new titlein 1942 in his own words: "Special Services was the cover designation forSecret Intelligence and Special Operations of all kinds and character." Tothe old pro the new designation was an important step forward in theevolution of the intelligence profession in the United States.One couldalmost see him hunching up to his desk to write a few more memoranda tothe President about the development of the intelligence services.It was nomistake when Dulles entitled his book The Craft of Intelligence.He wasthe crafty professional in a fast-growing profession.During 1943, General Donovan did his best to extend the OSS intoall those parts of the world left to him by the Navy, General MacArthur,and J.Edgar Hoover.At one time in 1943 he got a bit overambitious andwent to Moscow.There he met with his counterparts in the intelligenceprofession and was so won over by their good fellowship that he cameback to Washington to propose that there be an exchange programbetween the Russians and the Americans.Donovan proposed that theirhand-picked agents be brought to this country to learn all aboutIntelligence and special operations with Americans, utilizing newtechniques and equipment that we had.To those who recall the sameGeneral Donovan on countless platforms ranting about the "communistthreat" only a few years later, this proposal of his must seem to have beenpart of a soft-headed era.In any event, others such as J.Edgar Hoover and Admiral Leahy overruled Donovan's gesture of hospitality to the Russians.The OSS did set up a Guerrilla and Resistance Branch, whichoperated from Europe to Burma and was patterned after the highlysuccessful British Special Operations Executive (SOE) model.ButGeneral Donovan never got over the blows he suffered from MacArthurand Hoover.His wartime disappointment led him on many occasions torecommend that there be a single top intelligence director who would beplaced within the immediate Office of the President and that this directorbe a civilian who would control all other intelligence services, particularlymost of the military [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.(The author was a frequent visitor toManila and Saigon from 1952 through 1954 as the commanding officer ofa Military Air Transport Service squadron which provided much of themilitary airlift between those cities in those days, and on more than oneflight carried as special passengers members of the Lansdale team, bothU.S.and Filipino personnel, to and from Saigon).These plans, which were made for the development of a UnitedStates presence in Vietnam to replace the French after their defeat at DienBien Phu and to create a new leader to replace the French puppet, BaoDai, had been primarily developed by the operational CIA, almost as anatural follow-on of their production of Magsaysay.Ngo Dinh Diem was a selection and creation of the CIA, as well asothers such as Admiral Arthur Radford and Cardinal Spellman, but theprimary role in the early creation of the "father of his country" image forNgo Dinh Diem was played by the CIA -- and Edward G.Lansdale wasthe man upon whom this responsibility fell.He became such a firmsupporter of Diem that when he visited Diem just after Kennedy's electionhe carried with him a gift "from the U.S.Government", a huge desk setwith a brass plate across its base reading, "To Ngo Dinh Diem, The Fatherof His Country." The presentation of that gift to Diem by Lansdale markednearly seven years of close personal and official relationship, all under thesponsorship of the CIA.It was the CIA that created Diem's first elite bodyguard to keep himalive in those early and precarious days.It was the CIA that created theSpecial Forces of Vietnamese troops, which were under the tight controlof Ngo Dinh Nhu, and it was the CIA that created and directed the tens ofthousands of paramilitary forces of all kinds in South Vietnam duringthose difficult years of the Diem regime.Not until the U.S.Marineslanded in South Vietnam, in the van of the escalation in 1964, did anelement of American troops arrive in Vietnam that were not under theoperational control of the CIA.From 1945 through the crucial years of 1954 and 1955 and on to1964, almost everything that was done in South Vietnam, including even astrong role in the selection of generals and ambassadors, was the action ofthe CIA, with the DOD playing a supporting role and the Department ofState almost in total eclipse.Thus, when The New York Times asks, "Whydid the policy makers go ahead despite the intelligence estimates preparedby their most senior intelligence officials?" it has asked an excellentquestion, because it must include in the "most senior intelligence officials"the Director of Central Intelligence and others of the Agency.This makesone wonder at what point a man like Allen Dulles stops playing the role ofintelligence official and sees himself in the mirror as CIA clandestinecommander in chief. These examples have to make certain aspects of the release andpublication of the Pentagon Papers deeply suspect, especially since theman who says he released these vast volumes to the newspapers, DanielEllsberg, was ideally suited for this role by virtue of his Vietnamexperience with the very same Edward G.Lansdale.No matter what onemight wish to believe the intentions of Ellsberg were when he did this, itwould be most difficult to accept that he of all people did not know all thefacts.And if he did know all of the facts I have described, why did hewant to make it appear that it was Pentagon policymakers who went ahead"despite the intelligence estimates prepared by their most seniorintelligence officials"? Why has so much care been taken to make itappear that these are papers from the Pentagon that he has dumped on thenews media's doorstep? Why has no one made the proper distinction thatthe majority of these documents were not really Pentagon originated at all,but were originated in, among other places, the CIA (Covert side)?Certainly if his facts, as well as those presented by The New York Times,are right, the CIA (Covert side) was in a much better position to heed itsown CIA (Intelligence side) warnings and advice than any otherdepartment or agency in Washington.The answer to these questions becomes obvious.The CIA uses itsintelligence role as a cover mechanism for its operational activities.Furthermore it uses its own secret intelligence as an initiator for its ownsecret operations.This is what pleased General Donovan when PresidentRoosevelt unleashed him with the OSS and it is what has been the drivingforce behind the hard core operational agents within the intelligencecommunity since that time.Allen Dulles himself helps us to define General Donovan's new titlein 1942 in his own words: "Special Services was the cover designation forSecret Intelligence and Special Operations of all kinds and character." Tothe old pro the new designation was an important step forward in theevolution of the intelligence profession in the United States.One couldalmost see him hunching up to his desk to write a few more memoranda tothe President about the development of the intelligence services.It was nomistake when Dulles entitled his book The Craft of Intelligence.He wasthe crafty professional in a fast-growing profession.During 1943, General Donovan did his best to extend the OSS intoall those parts of the world left to him by the Navy, General MacArthur,and J.Edgar Hoover.At one time in 1943 he got a bit overambitious andwent to Moscow.There he met with his counterparts in the intelligenceprofession and was so won over by their good fellowship that he cameback to Washington to propose that there be an exchange programbetween the Russians and the Americans.Donovan proposed that theirhand-picked agents be brought to this country to learn all aboutIntelligence and special operations with Americans, utilizing newtechniques and equipment that we had.To those who recall the sameGeneral Donovan on countless platforms ranting about the "communistthreat" only a few years later, this proposal of his must seem to have beenpart of a soft-headed era.In any event, others such as J.Edgar Hoover and Admiral Leahy overruled Donovan's gesture of hospitality to the Russians.The OSS did set up a Guerrilla and Resistance Branch, whichoperated from Europe to Burma and was patterned after the highlysuccessful British Special Operations Executive (SOE) model.ButGeneral Donovan never got over the blows he suffered from MacArthurand Hoover.His wartime disappointment led him on many occasions torecommend that there be a single top intelligence director who would beplaced within the immediate Office of the President and that this directorbe a civilian who would control all other intelligence services, particularlymost of the military [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]