[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.In4the past, personalismo was used to implement serious political injustices and5was also associated with the underdevelopment or malfunctioning of large-6scale (supposedly impersonal) economic organizations.47To impose himself, General Somoza would use the strategic position that8had been given to him by the U.S.government.The National Guard, his princi-9pal organizational basis of support, had been recently established by the U.S.10Marine Corps, and he was its first Nicaraguan head; this opened opportunities11for him to create new rules in a still unsettled developing institution.5 Con-12centrating greater resources in a newly created constabulary psychologically[35], (3)13enhanced its power in the eyes of many opposition leaders, accustomed to14facing the far lesser developed state s physical force of the past.15Although not all groups held equally strong patrimonial values and atti- Lines: 39 t16tudes Nicaragua s political culture was not homogeneous, and there were 17groups that had republican, less patrimonial views the general s founding13.0pt P18coup d état received important local support.6 Thus in developing his strate- 19gies to alter the polity s configuration, Somoza used existing political orga- Normal Pa20nizations to modify them, one new, the other traditional: the National Guard* PgEnds: Ej21and the Liberal Party, respectively.The first one despite its small size was22an unusually strong force.The Liberal Party, by contrast, was relatively more23[35], (3)progressive and populistic, more attuned to the social democratic discourse24that had started to become popular in Latin America.Each of his two legitimate25sons would be placed in each of these organizations to grow up in them and26head them, to control the military and civilian bases of organized support for27the regime.28Sociocultural configurations can be viewed as predisposing factors that29serve as facilitators or obstacles for the materialization of political phe-30nomenon.There are also situational factors influencing concrete historical31conjunctures or processes.There even are instances in which chance plays a32paramount role in the historical results.There are some cases in which the33physical presence of a mortal but very powerful individual convincingly makes34a significant difference in the outcome; on average the importance of great35men is much greater in lesser-institutionalized polities and should not be36forgotten.And Somoza García not without opposition gave a special and37extreme discretionary patrimonial definition to the Nicaraguan state, as his3839 household or property, and of his family as inheritors.His rule was not simply40 a carbon copy of the past. 36 the somoza garcía legacy1 At various points the founder could have given up ruling some Latin2 American strongmen have peacefully stepped down and allowed democrati-3 zation.Somoza García was urged to do so by Nicaraguans and (occasionally)4 by the U.S.government.But his insatiable lust to dominate, lead, and manage5 men prevailed until he finally left power con las botas por delante ( with a bullet6 on his chest and his boots still on ).7 At every turn Somoza García outmaneuvered his adversaries.Every crisis8 seemed to result in strengthening his power; one of them immediately re-9 inforced the dynastic character of the regime.The General Somoza of my10 mission told me this story in 1977: In the 1940s the U.S.government wished11 to see my father not reelect himself; the differences between the two gov-12 ernments produced a crisis in 1947, when my father backed by the Liberal[36], (413 Party organized the replacement of the president.7 The United States broke14 relations with Nicaragua and withdrew the American officer supervising our15 Military Academy.My father immediately appointed me as the new director ofLines: 416 the Academy, where I took charge of the education of the future officer cadres. 17 And you see, Ambassador, the Somozas remained having the support of the0.0pt18 people, and U.S.-Nicaraguan relations eventually became normalized. 8 19 The story has historical significance.General Somoza, who had regard forNormal20 very few men but identified strongly with his father, viewed the Somozas asPgEnds:21 charismatic and invincible partly through his father s successes in outwitting22 adversaries.Because of this legacy, Somoza was inclined to dismiss the human23 rights policy of the Ford and Carter years as simply another American unreal- [36], (424 istic and temporary moralistic eccentricity; it was not until the very end that he25 realized more fully the consequences of our policy, that he had been defeated.26 In short, although the great man theory of history has more limited27 applicability especially in well-institutionalized, relatively depersonalized28 regimes (e.g., in the United States) the role of a personality, of charisma 29 (in Max Weber s technical sense, of the gift of the creator of a new normative30 order), cannot be dismissed in the establishment of the dynasty.The cult of31 founders of dynasties suggests their importance their psychological predis-32 positions, feelings and desires, personal goals attributed by their followers.33 A new regime a new political order, as the Somocista followers claimed34 had been born.9 It met with opposition until the assassination of the founder.35 For although facilitated by socioeconomic traits, dynastic rulership was not36 fully legitimized in Nicaragua s political culture; some groups sought a demo-37 cratic regime, helping create a disjointed political culture with its pseudo-38 democratic rationalizations.Under these conditions a bifurcation took place:39 the patrimonial loyalty of followers tended to be translated into intense disloy-40 alty by those not at the service of the ruler. the somoza garcía legacy 371 Main Regime Characteristics2 In order for a ruling group to remain in control of the state, it requires support3 from the state s armed forces; if it holds elections, it must be able to rig them;4 and it must keep the population s protests or rebellions under control.Dur-5 ing Somoza García s hegemony, basic successful principles to achieve these6 conditions were established, and in sharp contrast to some other caudillos,7 Somoza García left a more organized regime with lasting, relatively effective8 military and civilian organizations.109 Somoza followed personnel policies that resulted in only those loyal to him10 remaining in the National Guard.In every crisis of support, the founder moved11 very rapidly to purge from the institution the unfaithful (or those suspected to12 be so).His governance over the military was extremely patrimonial.He exer-[37], (5)13 cised wide discretion to appoint his men, those with his favor.For instance,14 in the 1940s, while still quite young, two of my contacts were appointed to very15 important senior positions because of Somoza García s liking. They lackedLines: 70 t16 any prior military training [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl przylepto3.keep.pl
.In4the past, personalismo was used to implement serious political injustices and5was also associated with the underdevelopment or malfunctioning of large-6scale (supposedly impersonal) economic organizations.47To impose himself, General Somoza would use the strategic position that8had been given to him by the U.S.government.The National Guard, his princi-9pal organizational basis of support, had been recently established by the U.S.10Marine Corps, and he was its first Nicaraguan head; this opened opportunities11for him to create new rules in a still unsettled developing institution.5 Con-12centrating greater resources in a newly created constabulary psychologically[35], (3)13enhanced its power in the eyes of many opposition leaders, accustomed to14facing the far lesser developed state s physical force of the past.15Although not all groups held equally strong patrimonial values and atti- Lines: 39 t16tudes Nicaragua s political culture was not homogeneous, and there were 17groups that had republican, less patrimonial views the general s founding13.0pt P18coup d état received important local support.6 Thus in developing his strate- 19gies to alter the polity s configuration, Somoza used existing political orga- Normal Pa20nizations to modify them, one new, the other traditional: the National Guard* PgEnds: Ej21and the Liberal Party, respectively.The first one despite its small size was22an unusually strong force.The Liberal Party, by contrast, was relatively more23[35], (3)progressive and populistic, more attuned to the social democratic discourse24that had started to become popular in Latin America.Each of his two legitimate25sons would be placed in each of these organizations to grow up in them and26head them, to control the military and civilian bases of organized support for27the regime.28Sociocultural configurations can be viewed as predisposing factors that29serve as facilitators or obstacles for the materialization of political phe-30nomenon.There are also situational factors influencing concrete historical31conjunctures or processes.There even are instances in which chance plays a32paramount role in the historical results.There are some cases in which the33physical presence of a mortal but very powerful individual convincingly makes34a significant difference in the outcome; on average the importance of great35men is much greater in lesser-institutionalized polities and should not be36forgotten.And Somoza García not without opposition gave a special and37extreme discretionary patrimonial definition to the Nicaraguan state, as his3839 household or property, and of his family as inheritors.His rule was not simply40 a carbon copy of the past. 36 the somoza garcía legacy1 At various points the founder could have given up ruling some Latin2 American strongmen have peacefully stepped down and allowed democrati-3 zation.Somoza García was urged to do so by Nicaraguans and (occasionally)4 by the U.S.government.But his insatiable lust to dominate, lead, and manage5 men prevailed until he finally left power con las botas por delante ( with a bullet6 on his chest and his boots still on ).7 At every turn Somoza García outmaneuvered his adversaries.Every crisis8 seemed to result in strengthening his power; one of them immediately re-9 inforced the dynastic character of the regime.The General Somoza of my10 mission told me this story in 1977: In the 1940s the U.S.government wished11 to see my father not reelect himself; the differences between the two gov-12 ernments produced a crisis in 1947, when my father backed by the Liberal[36], (413 Party organized the replacement of the president.7 The United States broke14 relations with Nicaragua and withdrew the American officer supervising our15 Military Academy.My father immediately appointed me as the new director ofLines: 416 the Academy, where I took charge of the education of the future officer cadres. 17 And you see, Ambassador, the Somozas remained having the support of the0.0pt18 people, and U.S.-Nicaraguan relations eventually became normalized. 8 19 The story has historical significance.General Somoza, who had regard forNormal20 very few men but identified strongly with his father, viewed the Somozas asPgEnds:21 charismatic and invincible partly through his father s successes in outwitting22 adversaries.Because of this legacy, Somoza was inclined to dismiss the human23 rights policy of the Ford and Carter years as simply another American unreal- [36], (424 istic and temporary moralistic eccentricity; it was not until the very end that he25 realized more fully the consequences of our policy, that he had been defeated.26 In short, although the great man theory of history has more limited27 applicability especially in well-institutionalized, relatively depersonalized28 regimes (e.g., in the United States) the role of a personality, of charisma 29 (in Max Weber s technical sense, of the gift of the creator of a new normative30 order), cannot be dismissed in the establishment of the dynasty.The cult of31 founders of dynasties suggests their importance their psychological predis-32 positions, feelings and desires, personal goals attributed by their followers.33 A new regime a new political order, as the Somocista followers claimed34 had been born.9 It met with opposition until the assassination of the founder.35 For although facilitated by socioeconomic traits, dynastic rulership was not36 fully legitimized in Nicaragua s political culture; some groups sought a demo-37 cratic regime, helping create a disjointed political culture with its pseudo-38 democratic rationalizations.Under these conditions a bifurcation took place:39 the patrimonial loyalty of followers tended to be translated into intense disloy-40 alty by those not at the service of the ruler. the somoza garcía legacy 371 Main Regime Characteristics2 In order for a ruling group to remain in control of the state, it requires support3 from the state s armed forces; if it holds elections, it must be able to rig them;4 and it must keep the population s protests or rebellions under control.Dur-5 ing Somoza García s hegemony, basic successful principles to achieve these6 conditions were established, and in sharp contrast to some other caudillos,7 Somoza García left a more organized regime with lasting, relatively effective8 military and civilian organizations.109 Somoza followed personnel policies that resulted in only those loyal to him10 remaining in the National Guard.In every crisis of support, the founder moved11 very rapidly to purge from the institution the unfaithful (or those suspected to12 be so).His governance over the military was extremely patrimonial.He exer-[37], (5)13 cised wide discretion to appoint his men, those with his favor.For instance,14 in the 1940s, while still quite young, two of my contacts were appointed to very15 important senior positions because of Somoza García s liking. They lackedLines: 70 t16 any prior military training [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]