[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.Many of these so-called africanistas had chosen to serve in Moroccobecause colonial service there offered them the opportunity for rapidpromotion and better pay.But many also justified their involvementin ideological terms.Official discourse encouraged the belief that thecolonial army was in Morocco to enable the penetration into NorthAfrica of Western civilization, embodied not only by capitalist mod-ernity but also by traditional Spanish values, which were buttressed byChristianity.Underpinning this sense of mission was the belief that ofall the European powers, Spain was the best suited for this task becauseof its historic links with the Arab world.Beyond this rationalizationlay a further conviction.Through military and civil penetration intothe area, Spain could once again grow into a colonial power with astatus among nations that it had lost in Spanish America.This couldonly be achieved, according to the africanista discourse, through theforging of a highly disciplined and professional army, properly trainedand equipped and led by officers hardened by war and strengthened bythe esprit de corps created by battle.36Indeed, the military africanistas were united by a sense of mission inMorocco to restore the prestige of the army and the nation. The Africancampaign , Francisco Franco wrote in 1921, is the best training-school,if not the only one, for our Army, and in it positive values and qualitiesare put to the test, and this officer corps on combat duty in Africa, withits high morale and self-esteem, must become the heart and soul of themainland army. 37 The camaraderie of war in Morocco, together withthe commitment to this mission, helped to erode the divisions betweenthe different corps of the military that set them apart as castes in themainland army.The more technical artillery and engineering corpsand the small but prestigious group of pilots mixed socially with infan-try and cavalry officers in camp and garrison life.Their collaborationon the fields of battle, especially after the Disaster of Annual in 1921,imbued many officers of the different corps with a shared hatred of theenemy and a common purpose of retribution.Nevertheless, becausethe military campaigns in Morocco were largely fought by infantry andcavalry, that new esprit de corps was most developed in their ranks.The africanistas shared an unqualified contempt for garrison life inSpain and, in particular, for the conduct of the peninsular junteros, 266 Sebastian Balfourwhom they felt were impeding a reform of the army that could releasethe resources necessary for a victorious conclusion of the campaigns inMorocco.They also distrusted the politicians of the Restoration systemand deeply resented those civilian elites who failed to recognize thesacrifices endured by the Army of Africa.Civil society in Spain was seenas tainted, and full of compromises.These attitudes eroded any residualfaith in the efficacy of the Restoration regime or indeed of any civilianregime.Africanism united officers who had fought in the 1895 8 colo-nial wars and had felt betrayed by the regime, and a new generation,38who experienced war for the first time in Morocco and felt increas-ingly bitter towards the same regime for its apparent failure to supportthem.The colonial campaigns were seen as the forge shaping a newmilitary elite that would regenerate Spain.A leading africanista officer,Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, in the editorial of the first edition of theafricanista journal, Revista de Tropas Coloniales, written a few monthsafter the military coup of General Miguel Primo de Rivera de Rivera in1923, wrote that Spain s progressive fall into an abyss of anarchy underthe Restoration regime was halted by a few men of heart, who, riskingeverything, confronted the arduous task of resurrecting the spirit ofSpain dulled by Muslim fatalism.to guide it onto the path worthy ofits glorious history.39Similar principles also set the africanistas against some other offic-ers serving in Morocco, not all of whom could be described as junteros.These officers continued to behave according to the traditional practicesof the military in Spain.Among them were those who had not volun-teered to fight but had been posted to Morocco and for whom militaryintervention there had little ideological or political appeal.Rather thanundergo the harsh conditions of campaign life, some sought to spendas much time as possible in the more relaxed context of the garrisons inthe main towns of Ceuta, Tetuan and Melilla.As is evident in the reportof General Picasso, the military magistrate in charge of investigationsinto the Disaster of 1921, several officers (including a leading juntero)were in these towns rather than with their units when the military routtook place.40Indeed, what evoked scorn from the africanistas and greater divi-sion among officers serving in the colonial army was the reproductionof the culture of peninsular military life in the Moroccan garrisons.Though womanizing was acceptable to the africanistas, other commonpractices such as nepotism, bureaucracy, corruption and gambling weredeeply despised as typical vices of Restoration society and obstacles notjust to the military campaign but also to the regeneration of Spain. The Making of an Interventionist Army 267Traditional military tactics, such as the deployment of large numbersof troops over a vast area, linked by isolated defensive posts difficult tosupply, were also frowned on.Instead, the africanistas sought modernmodels of military tactics amongst the German and French armies.Thus some pushed for the use of planes, tanks and toxic gas (see below)in the Moroccan campaigns, although the use of tanks had few posi-tive consequences.For the military africanistas, the two major disas-ters of 1909 and 1921 had at least provided the opportunity for theregeneration of the army.The Annual Disaster, in particular, turnedthe deeply felt professional disputes between the military africanistasand the junteros into profound antipathy.So tense were their relationsthat a pro-Junta military paper saw in them the germs of a fearfulcivil war.41 The particular focus of the renewed factionalism was theissue of responsibility for the Disaster, which the junteros above all wereseeking to impose.The Annual Disaster itself had triggered a fierce military reactionin the army and jingoist demonstrations in Spain.It undermined thealready cracked cement of the Restoration state and provided a furtherself-justification for the military coup of General Primo de Rivera in1923.It had been an open secret that the army in Spain was aboutto seize power.Of the four main co-ordinators of the coup, two wereveterans of the colonial war.The support of the majority of colonialofficers for Primo de Rivera s coup might seem paradoxical.The gen-eral had been the most decided supporter in the army of withdrawingfrom Morocco altogether.The latter part of his career had been basedexclusively in Spain so he did not form part of the africanista coterie.Unpardonably for many colonial officers, he had backed the JuntasMilitares de Defensa, the corporatist movement among officers in Spain.Yet the africanistas shared his determination to end what they saw asthe civilian government s persecution of the military for the Disasterof Annual.The second board of inquiry over the Disaster set up by thegovernment, the Responsibilities Committee, was due shortly to pro-nounce its verdict [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Many of these so-called africanistas had chosen to serve in Moroccobecause colonial service there offered them the opportunity for rapidpromotion and better pay.But many also justified their involvementin ideological terms.Official discourse encouraged the belief that thecolonial army was in Morocco to enable the penetration into NorthAfrica of Western civilization, embodied not only by capitalist mod-ernity but also by traditional Spanish values, which were buttressed byChristianity.Underpinning this sense of mission was the belief that ofall the European powers, Spain was the best suited for this task becauseof its historic links with the Arab world.Beyond this rationalizationlay a further conviction.Through military and civil penetration intothe area, Spain could once again grow into a colonial power with astatus among nations that it had lost in Spanish America.This couldonly be achieved, according to the africanista discourse, through theforging of a highly disciplined and professional army, properly trainedand equipped and led by officers hardened by war and strengthened bythe esprit de corps created by battle.36Indeed, the military africanistas were united by a sense of mission inMorocco to restore the prestige of the army and the nation. The Africancampaign , Francisco Franco wrote in 1921, is the best training-school,if not the only one, for our Army, and in it positive values and qualitiesare put to the test, and this officer corps on combat duty in Africa, withits high morale and self-esteem, must become the heart and soul of themainland army. 37 The camaraderie of war in Morocco, together withthe commitment to this mission, helped to erode the divisions betweenthe different corps of the military that set them apart as castes in themainland army.The more technical artillery and engineering corpsand the small but prestigious group of pilots mixed socially with infan-try and cavalry officers in camp and garrison life.Their collaborationon the fields of battle, especially after the Disaster of Annual in 1921,imbued many officers of the different corps with a shared hatred of theenemy and a common purpose of retribution.Nevertheless, becausethe military campaigns in Morocco were largely fought by infantry andcavalry, that new esprit de corps was most developed in their ranks.The africanistas shared an unqualified contempt for garrison life inSpain and, in particular, for the conduct of the peninsular junteros, 266 Sebastian Balfourwhom they felt were impeding a reform of the army that could releasethe resources necessary for a victorious conclusion of the campaigns inMorocco.They also distrusted the politicians of the Restoration systemand deeply resented those civilian elites who failed to recognize thesacrifices endured by the Army of Africa.Civil society in Spain was seenas tainted, and full of compromises.These attitudes eroded any residualfaith in the efficacy of the Restoration regime or indeed of any civilianregime.Africanism united officers who had fought in the 1895 8 colo-nial wars and had felt betrayed by the regime, and a new generation,38who experienced war for the first time in Morocco and felt increas-ingly bitter towards the same regime for its apparent failure to supportthem.The colonial campaigns were seen as the forge shaping a newmilitary elite that would regenerate Spain.A leading africanista officer,Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, in the editorial of the first edition of theafricanista journal, Revista de Tropas Coloniales, written a few monthsafter the military coup of General Miguel Primo de Rivera de Rivera in1923, wrote that Spain s progressive fall into an abyss of anarchy underthe Restoration regime was halted by a few men of heart, who, riskingeverything, confronted the arduous task of resurrecting the spirit ofSpain dulled by Muslim fatalism.to guide it onto the path worthy ofits glorious history.39Similar principles also set the africanistas against some other offic-ers serving in Morocco, not all of whom could be described as junteros.These officers continued to behave according to the traditional practicesof the military in Spain.Among them were those who had not volun-teered to fight but had been posted to Morocco and for whom militaryintervention there had little ideological or political appeal.Rather thanundergo the harsh conditions of campaign life, some sought to spendas much time as possible in the more relaxed context of the garrisons inthe main towns of Ceuta, Tetuan and Melilla.As is evident in the reportof General Picasso, the military magistrate in charge of investigationsinto the Disaster of 1921, several officers (including a leading juntero)were in these towns rather than with their units when the military routtook place.40Indeed, what evoked scorn from the africanistas and greater divi-sion among officers serving in the colonial army was the reproductionof the culture of peninsular military life in the Moroccan garrisons.Though womanizing was acceptable to the africanistas, other commonpractices such as nepotism, bureaucracy, corruption and gambling weredeeply despised as typical vices of Restoration society and obstacles notjust to the military campaign but also to the regeneration of Spain. The Making of an Interventionist Army 267Traditional military tactics, such as the deployment of large numbersof troops over a vast area, linked by isolated defensive posts difficult tosupply, were also frowned on.Instead, the africanistas sought modernmodels of military tactics amongst the German and French armies.Thus some pushed for the use of planes, tanks and toxic gas (see below)in the Moroccan campaigns, although the use of tanks had few posi-tive consequences.For the military africanistas, the two major disas-ters of 1909 and 1921 had at least provided the opportunity for theregeneration of the army.The Annual Disaster, in particular, turnedthe deeply felt professional disputes between the military africanistasand the junteros into profound antipathy.So tense were their relationsthat a pro-Junta military paper saw in them the germs of a fearfulcivil war.41 The particular focus of the renewed factionalism was theissue of responsibility for the Disaster, which the junteros above all wereseeking to impose.The Annual Disaster itself had triggered a fierce military reactionin the army and jingoist demonstrations in Spain.It undermined thealready cracked cement of the Restoration state and provided a furtherself-justification for the military coup of General Primo de Rivera in1923.It had been an open secret that the army in Spain was aboutto seize power.Of the four main co-ordinators of the coup, two wereveterans of the colonial war.The support of the majority of colonialofficers for Primo de Rivera s coup might seem paradoxical.The gen-eral had been the most decided supporter in the army of withdrawingfrom Morocco altogether.The latter part of his career had been basedexclusively in Spain so he did not form part of the africanista coterie.Unpardonably for many colonial officers, he had backed the JuntasMilitares de Defensa, the corporatist movement among officers in Spain.Yet the africanistas shared his determination to end what they saw asthe civilian government s persecution of the military for the Disasterof Annual.The second board of inquiry over the Disaster set up by thegovernment, the Responsibilities Committee, was due shortly to pro-nounce its verdict [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]