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.In 1971, atimid, ill-qualified functionary from the Communist Party CentralCommittee, Fyodor Konstantinovich Mortin, was named to replaceSakharovsky as chief of intelligence.A short, balding man with pale blue eyes, Mortin lacked culture,education, and, above all, practical experience as an intelligence offi-cer.To think that this was the man who headed the feared KGB spyoperations was laughable.I have rarely met a person who was moreunsure of himself, more indecisive, more cowardly.On several occa-sions I was in Mortin s office when Andropov phoned.Mortin literallyjumped when the special line from Andropov rang, and he wouldcringe and stutter as he sought to assure the chairman that everythingwould be carried out according to his wishes.His behavior wasn tmuch better when someone called from the Central Committee; afterhanging up with a Communist Party big shot, Mortin would get onthe phone with his subordinates and demand that the Party s orderno matter how foolish be carried out.If I or another of his under-lings resisted the order, Mortin would literally implore us to somehow close the matter and fulfill the Party directive.The one good thingabout Mortin was that he would allow more aggressive departmentleaders like myself to take matters into our own hands.He realized wewere professionals, and if things generally were going smoothly hewould not interfere with our operations.And unlike his successorthe double-dealing Vladimir Kryuchkov Mortin was fundamentallya decent, if weak person.One episode vividly illustrated Mortin s spinelessness.One of mycounterintelligence officers in Istanbul, a recruit from the KGB bordertroops with a fine record and fluent command of Turkish, got into a 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 277COLLI SI ON 277violent row with his wife and disappeared for nearly a day on a drink-ing binge.His wife grew scared and went to the KGB resident in Is-tanbul who, fearing the man might be vulnerable to subversion byTurkish authorities, sent a coded report about the incident to KGBheadquarters in Moscow.Andropov happened to see the report andpromptly ordered that the officer be recalled and dismissed.When I saw the order, I went to Mortin and argued that Andropovhad overreacted. The man made a mistake, but we should give him a chance, Itold Mortin. He should be reprimanded but not recalled and dis-missed.He s a good officer.I think you should make the case beforeAndropov. Are you out of your mind? Mortin shot back. There s no way I mgoing to do anything like that. Mortin wouldn t budge, despite repeated coaxing on my part,though he finally said he wouldn t object if I went to Andropov andpleaded for leniency.A few weeks later, Andropov visited Yasenovo and I was given abrief audience with the KGB head. Look, I said, you ordered that this guy be recalled and fired.Buthe s an excellent officer who made one mistake.He speaks excellentTurkish and has a bright future there.We don t have to do this to him. Andropov mulled things over a few seconds and then said, Okay,have it your way. I was carrying the dismissal order in my hands; thechairman took it from me, crossed out his earlier directive, andhanded back the paper.And so the man s fate was decided with astroke of the pen.Had it been up to Mortin, our officer in Turkeywould have been drummed out of the KGB.Mortin was shunted aside in 1974 because Andropov had come toview him as ineffectual.But his downfall also was due, in part, to theconniving of his successor, Vladimir Kryuchkov.We had received information from a high-ranking asset in Frenchintelligence that there was an unspecified mole in one of our KGB sta-tions in Europe.Kryuchkov traveled to Paris to meet with our French 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 278278 SPYMASTERsource and determined to catch the traitor.The Frenchman identifiedseveral potential spies, though when I saw the list of names I washighly skeptical.One of those under suspicion was our resident in Switzerland, whoat the time of Kryuchkov s return was on vacation in Moscow.Theman also was a good friend of Mortin s; they were from the sametown in Russia.Kryuchkov ordered me to begin tapping the Moscowphone of our Swiss resident, though I argued that he was a good offi-cer and we had no reason to suspect him.Kryuchkov insisted, how-ever, and within a day I was receiving transcripts of the subject stelephone calls.They were innocuous, except for one conversation inwhich a hoarse-voiced man warned our resident in Switzerland thatan investigation was under way and their call might be monitored.Ishowed the transcript to Kryuchkov, who snorted with satisfactionand insisted I find out who was tipping off the suspect.In fact, as Ilater discovered, Kryuchkov already knew who had made the callMortin who had telephoned his old friend to warn him that he wasunder investigation.Kryuchkov made sure that Andropov saw thetranscript, thus hastening Mortin s demise after only two years on thejob.I now think that Kryuchkov initiated a bogus investigation of ourman in Switzerland because he was a close friend of Mortin s, all thewhile hoping that Mortin might make a false step as he came to hiscompatriot s defense.It was a typical Kryuchkov move.In all my years in the KGB, I encountered few as scheming, slip-pery, and duplicitous as Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov.Whenwe met in 1971, we took an almost instant dislike to each other.I sawKryuchkov as a wily Communist Party bureaucrat with little businessbeing in intelligence, and he saw me as an Andropov protégé, a po-tential rival, and a professional officer who often disputed his judg-ments.I of course had no clue that twenty years later Kryuchkovwould take his place in history as the chief plotter of the CommunistParty coup against Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev.But I alwayshad an abiding distrust of Kryuchkov, and in late 1984, just beforeGorbachev took power, I went to my old friend and top Gorbachev 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 279COLLI SI ON 279adviser, Alexander Yakovlev, to warn the Gorbachev team aboutKryuchkov. Don t trust him, I told Yakovlev, stressing that I hadwatched Kryuchkov in action for nearly a decade and knew him to bedangerous and dishonest.Gorbachev was to receive similar warnings from other people, butunfortunately he would brush them aside.After all, he and Kryuchkovwere closely linked, as both had been protégés of Yuri Andropov.Gor-bachev, who had held the relatively obscure post of Communist Partyfirst secretary in the Stavropol region, had been chosen by Andropovto come to Moscow and ultimately serve on the Politburo.Andropovhad taken Kryuchkov under his wing nearly three decades earlier,when the two met at the Soviet embassy in Budapest.So Gorbachevwas inclined (fatally so) to believe in Kryuchkov, in part because hewas Andropov s man, but also because regional Communist Partybosses like Gorbachev traditionally placed great faith in the KGB,viewing the organization as an astute shaper and interpreter of events.In the three years Kryuchkov served Gorbachev, the Soviet leadercame to rely on the KGB chairman more and more, receiving a steadystream of doctored and biased information that tended to isolateGorbachev and alter his view of the historic forces swirling aroundhim [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.In 1971, atimid, ill-qualified functionary from the Communist Party CentralCommittee, Fyodor Konstantinovich Mortin, was named to replaceSakharovsky as chief of intelligence.A short, balding man with pale blue eyes, Mortin lacked culture,education, and, above all, practical experience as an intelligence offi-cer.To think that this was the man who headed the feared KGB spyoperations was laughable.I have rarely met a person who was moreunsure of himself, more indecisive, more cowardly.On several occa-sions I was in Mortin s office when Andropov phoned.Mortin literallyjumped when the special line from Andropov rang, and he wouldcringe and stutter as he sought to assure the chairman that everythingwould be carried out according to his wishes.His behavior wasn tmuch better when someone called from the Central Committee; afterhanging up with a Communist Party big shot, Mortin would get onthe phone with his subordinates and demand that the Party s orderno matter how foolish be carried out.If I or another of his under-lings resisted the order, Mortin would literally implore us to somehow close the matter and fulfill the Party directive.The one good thingabout Mortin was that he would allow more aggressive departmentleaders like myself to take matters into our own hands.He realized wewere professionals, and if things generally were going smoothly hewould not interfere with our operations.And unlike his successorthe double-dealing Vladimir Kryuchkov Mortin was fundamentallya decent, if weak person.One episode vividly illustrated Mortin s spinelessness.One of mycounterintelligence officers in Istanbul, a recruit from the KGB bordertroops with a fine record and fluent command of Turkish, got into a 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 277COLLI SI ON 277violent row with his wife and disappeared for nearly a day on a drink-ing binge.His wife grew scared and went to the KGB resident in Is-tanbul who, fearing the man might be vulnerable to subversion byTurkish authorities, sent a coded report about the incident to KGBheadquarters in Moscow.Andropov happened to see the report andpromptly ordered that the officer be recalled and dismissed.When I saw the order, I went to Mortin and argued that Andropovhad overreacted. The man made a mistake, but we should give him a chance, Itold Mortin. He should be reprimanded but not recalled and dis-missed.He s a good officer.I think you should make the case beforeAndropov. Are you out of your mind? Mortin shot back. There s no way I mgoing to do anything like that. Mortin wouldn t budge, despite repeated coaxing on my part,though he finally said he wouldn t object if I went to Andropov andpleaded for leniency.A few weeks later, Andropov visited Yasenovo and I was given abrief audience with the KGB head. Look, I said, you ordered that this guy be recalled and fired.Buthe s an excellent officer who made one mistake.He speaks excellentTurkish and has a bright future there.We don t have to do this to him. Andropov mulled things over a few seconds and then said, Okay,have it your way. I was carrying the dismissal order in my hands; thechairman took it from me, crossed out his earlier directive, andhanded back the paper.And so the man s fate was decided with astroke of the pen.Had it been up to Mortin, our officer in Turkeywould have been drummed out of the KGB.Mortin was shunted aside in 1974 because Andropov had come toview him as ineffectual.But his downfall also was due, in part, to theconniving of his successor, Vladimir Kryuchkov.We had received information from a high-ranking asset in Frenchintelligence that there was an unspecified mole in one of our KGB sta-tions in Europe.Kryuchkov traveled to Paris to meet with our French 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 278278 SPYMASTERsource and determined to catch the traitor.The Frenchman identifiedseveral potential spies, though when I saw the list of names I washighly skeptical.One of those under suspicion was our resident in Switzerland, whoat the time of Kryuchkov s return was on vacation in Moscow.Theman also was a good friend of Mortin s; they were from the sametown in Russia.Kryuchkov ordered me to begin tapping the Moscowphone of our Swiss resident, though I argued that he was a good offi-cer and we had no reason to suspect him.Kryuchkov insisted, how-ever, and within a day I was receiving transcripts of the subject stelephone calls.They were innocuous, except for one conversation inwhich a hoarse-voiced man warned our resident in Switzerland thatan investigation was under way and their call might be monitored.Ishowed the transcript to Kryuchkov, who snorted with satisfactionand insisted I find out who was tipping off the suspect.In fact, as Ilater discovered, Kryuchkov already knew who had made the callMortin who had telephoned his old friend to warn him that he wasunder investigation.Kryuchkov made sure that Andropov saw thetranscript, thus hastening Mortin s demise after only two years on thejob.I now think that Kryuchkov initiated a bogus investigation of ourman in Switzerland because he was a close friend of Mortin s, all thewhile hoping that Mortin might make a false step as he came to hiscompatriot s defense.It was a typical Kryuchkov move.In all my years in the KGB, I encountered few as scheming, slip-pery, and duplicitous as Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov.Whenwe met in 1971, we took an almost instant dislike to each other.I sawKryuchkov as a wily Communist Party bureaucrat with little businessbeing in intelligence, and he saw me as an Andropov protégé, a po-tential rival, and a professional officer who often disputed his judg-ments.I of course had no clue that twenty years later Kryuchkovwould take his place in history as the chief plotter of the CommunistParty coup against Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev.But I alwayshad an abiding distrust of Kryuchkov, and in late 1984, just beforeGorbachev took power, I went to my old friend and top Gorbachev 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 279COLLI SI ON 279adviser, Alexander Yakovlev, to warn the Gorbachev team aboutKryuchkov. Don t trust him, I told Yakovlev, stressing that I hadwatched Kryuchkov in action for nearly a decade and knew him to bedangerous and dishonest.Gorbachev was to receive similar warnings from other people, butunfortunately he would brush them aside.After all, he and Kryuchkovwere closely linked, as both had been protégés of Yuri Andropov.Gor-bachev, who had held the relatively obscure post of Communist Partyfirst secretary in the Stavropol region, had been chosen by Andropovto come to Moscow and ultimately serve on the Politburo.Andropovhad taken Kryuchkov under his wing nearly three decades earlier,when the two met at the Soviet embassy in Budapest.So Gorbachevwas inclined (fatally so) to believe in Kryuchkov, in part because hewas Andropov s man, but also because regional Communist Partybosses like Gorbachev traditionally placed great faith in the KGB,viewing the organization as an astute shaper and interpreter of events.In the three years Kryuchkov served Gorbachev, the Soviet leadercame to rely on the KGB chairman more and more, receiving a steadystream of doctored and biased information that tended to isolateGorbachev and alter his view of the historic forces swirling aroundhim [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]