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.As wouldbe expected from such a low-profile event as an uncontroversialSupreme Court appointment, there is no long-term approval gainfor the president.A high-profile nominee, on the other hand, attracts press noticeand public attention but is more likely to harm the president becauseof the controversy engendered by the appointment.For example, byappointing Clarence Thomas to the court, President George H.W.Bush may have succeeded in satisfying some conservative groups.ButBush s public approval ratings continued to fall as he faced a primarychallenge for reelection.In fact, failure to confirm a nominee can reinforce the image of anineffectual president.The Reagan administration s inability to confirmRobert Bork reinforced the image of Reagan as a lame-duck president.Failure instills in others a sense of the administration s weakness; suc-cess may result in temporary goodwill but primarily relief over theabsence of failure.Supreme Court nominations bring few spillover 152 electing justicebenefits to presidential approval, but they can be abundant with draw-backs for an administration.To avoid such damage, administrations sometimes distance them-selves from unpopular nominees.Again, the Bork process is a clas-sic example.While Robert Bork struggled to gain confirmation in theface of widespread opposition from groups and, eventually, a majorityof senators, the Reagan administration backed away from active sup-port.In contrast, the Bush administration worked actively in ClarenceThomas s behalf, even in the midst of his difficulties.But this action, atthe commencement of the president s reelection bid, was a contributingfactor to his subsequent free fall in the public opinion polls (althoughnot necessarily with his own core constituency) and eventual defeat.Others images are also at stake.The groups who stake out posi-tions and engage in active support or opposition are affected.Forexample, in the Ginsburg nomination, women s groups, concernedabout their image with the press and their own constituency, did notwant to be seen publicly opposing a female nominee.They would facestronger approbation than some of the African American leadershipfaced when opposing Clarence Thomas on account of Ginsburg s pastactivity as a leader in the women s movement.Hence, although manygroup leaders worried about Ginsburg s views, they offered at leasttepid support during the confirmation process.Even opposition groups have their own image-making efforts inmind.In the Ginsburg nomination, for example, conservative groups,who faced certain defeat in an effort to derail the Ginsburg confirma-tion process, still needed to satisfy constituents that they performed auseful function in the judicial selection.The opposition s focus in such circumstances is on the future.Speaking during the Ginsburg confirmation process in 1993, ThomasJipping claimed the conservative camp still gained mileage during theconfirmation process from their efforts opposing Ginsburg: We areusing the Ginsburg nomination, not so much to lobby against her.But we re using this as a way of defining these issues, of activism andrestraint.Getting on the record the way we evaluate judges; usingit as a kind of educational effort for the future. 31 today s nomination process 153When opposition is politically doomed, the groups walk a fine line.On one hand, their constituencies expect some action will be taken toexpress their views.On the other hand, the group does not want towaste political capital on a fruitless effort.Rather, they prefer to savetheir ammunition for more effective fights.In addition, the groups other battles may affect the Senate s will-ingness to engage a nominee likely to win confirmation anyway.In1986, liberal groups fought the nomination of William Rehnquist aschief justice and spent their political capital on that effort [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.As wouldbe expected from such a low-profile event as an uncontroversialSupreme Court appointment, there is no long-term approval gainfor the president.A high-profile nominee, on the other hand, attracts press noticeand public attention but is more likely to harm the president becauseof the controversy engendered by the appointment.For example, byappointing Clarence Thomas to the court, President George H.W.Bush may have succeeded in satisfying some conservative groups.ButBush s public approval ratings continued to fall as he faced a primarychallenge for reelection.In fact, failure to confirm a nominee can reinforce the image of anineffectual president.The Reagan administration s inability to confirmRobert Bork reinforced the image of Reagan as a lame-duck president.Failure instills in others a sense of the administration s weakness; suc-cess may result in temporary goodwill but primarily relief over theabsence of failure.Supreme Court nominations bring few spillover 152 electing justicebenefits to presidential approval, but they can be abundant with draw-backs for an administration.To avoid such damage, administrations sometimes distance them-selves from unpopular nominees.Again, the Bork process is a clas-sic example.While Robert Bork struggled to gain confirmation in theface of widespread opposition from groups and, eventually, a majorityof senators, the Reagan administration backed away from active sup-port.In contrast, the Bush administration worked actively in ClarenceThomas s behalf, even in the midst of his difficulties.But this action, atthe commencement of the president s reelection bid, was a contributingfactor to his subsequent free fall in the public opinion polls (althoughnot necessarily with his own core constituency) and eventual defeat.Others images are also at stake.The groups who stake out posi-tions and engage in active support or opposition are affected.Forexample, in the Ginsburg nomination, women s groups, concernedabout their image with the press and their own constituency, did notwant to be seen publicly opposing a female nominee.They would facestronger approbation than some of the African American leadershipfaced when opposing Clarence Thomas on account of Ginsburg s pastactivity as a leader in the women s movement.Hence, although manygroup leaders worried about Ginsburg s views, they offered at leasttepid support during the confirmation process.Even opposition groups have their own image-making efforts inmind.In the Ginsburg nomination, for example, conservative groups,who faced certain defeat in an effort to derail the Ginsburg confirma-tion process, still needed to satisfy constituents that they performed auseful function in the judicial selection.The opposition s focus in such circumstances is on the future.Speaking during the Ginsburg confirmation process in 1993, ThomasJipping claimed the conservative camp still gained mileage during theconfirmation process from their efforts opposing Ginsburg: We areusing the Ginsburg nomination, not so much to lobby against her.But we re using this as a way of defining these issues, of activism andrestraint.Getting on the record the way we evaluate judges; usingit as a kind of educational effort for the future. 31 today s nomination process 153When opposition is politically doomed, the groups walk a fine line.On one hand, their constituencies expect some action will be taken toexpress their views.On the other hand, the group does not want towaste political capital on a fruitless effort.Rather, they prefer to savetheir ammunition for more effective fights.In addition, the groups other battles may affect the Senate s will-ingness to engage a nominee likely to win confirmation anyway.In1986, liberal groups fought the nomination of William Rehnquist aschief justice and spent their political capital on that effort [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]