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.Davis arguesthat the image of an expansive, subversive force can represent individual andcommunal anxieties over being duped and slipping behind. 89.Information Centers hearing, 44, 50.90.Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy, 198.91.Benton, Europe and Senator McCarthy, 4.92.For information on the effects of the McCarthy committee, see LaurienAlexandre, The Voice of America: From Detente to the Reagan Doctrine (Norwood,NJ: Ablex, 1988), 13; Ambrose, Eisenhower, 61; Dizard, The Strategy of Truth,43; Fried, Men Against McCarthy, 258; Goldston, The American Nightmare,122 123; Oshinsky, A Conspiracy, 278 284; Pirsein, The Voice of America, 246;Reeves, The Life and Times, 491; and Hans N.Tuch, Communicating with theWorld: U.S.Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St.Martin s Press, 1990),18.93.See Brendon, Ike, 276; and Griffith, The Politics of Fear, 196, 200. 6Propaganda as a Presidential Toolin the Eisenhower White HouseIn addition to the McCarthy hearings that centered on the Voice of Americaand the information libraries discussed in chapter 5, there were other con-gressional and executive committees that investigated the U.S.govern-ment s propaganda and psychological warfare operations at the outset ofthe Eisenhower administration.To begin with, the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee turned its attention to the propaganda program in November1952 as well as in March and April 1953.These senators hoped to deter-mine how best to make the peacetime propaganda program a more effectiveCold War instrument.1Accompanying the congressional hearings were two presidentially ap-pointed committee investigations that greatly impacted the future of thepropaganda program.While the scope of the first, the President s AdvisoryCommittee on Government Reorganization (Rockefeller committee), ex-tended beyond the practice of propaganda, it provided a major impetus forremoving the program from the Department of State.The second, which Ei-senhower called the President s Committee on International InformationActivities (Jackson committee), centered exclusively on the propagandaprogram and suggested the most significant programmatic reforms.At thetime of the investigation, the Eisenhower administration determined that no publicity should be given to the [Jackson] Committee or its work, 2with the bulk of its recommendations remaining classified until the 1980s.Since then, however, it has become quite clear that the Jackson committee 130 The Period of Institutionalizationplayed a very significant role in the Eisenhower administration s entire ap-proach to the Cold War.As Blanche Wiesen Cook argues, the committee sactivities influenced United States foreign policy for decades, 3 particu-larly the role of propaganda in relation to U.S.foreign policy.As this chapter shows, all of the investigations eventually helped bringabout the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA)on August 1, 1953.This act removed the program from the Department ofState and awarded propaganda a more prominent and permanent place inthe foreign policy apparatus of the U.S.government.While the structure re-sembled its historical predecessors (e.g., the Committee for Public Infor-mation and the Office of War Information), it became much more central tothe U.S.foreign policy mission during wartime and peacetime.Wilson P.Dizard maintains that the USIA s formation confirmed and cemented thegrowing importance of popular persuasion in foreign policy. 4 As membersof the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) expressed in 1952, nothing ismore important to the President in a critical time of mounting internationaltensions when an accidental bombing could lead to war. 5It was not by accident nor is it surprising that propaganda blossomed un-der Eisenhower s tenure.During World War II, Eisenhower exhibited akeen interest in psychological operations a devotion that grew out of Ei-senhower s desire to avoid conventional warfare.6 Eisenhower s commit-ment to propaganda extended to his appointment of career propagandist, C.D.Jackson, as special assistant to the president, as chief advisor on psycho-logical strategy, and as presidential speech writer.7While the conclusions reached by the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-tee combined with the Rockefeller and McCarthy committees to inspire theindependent status of the U.S.propaganda program, the Jackson committeeencouraged the development of new covert Cold War strategies during theEisenhower administration.Determined to rehabilitate the propaganda pro-gram from the attacks of the McCarthy committee and the problems of theTruman administration s propaganda tactics, this reorganization reducedthe number of propaganda channels openly identified with the U.S.govern-ment and increased secret operations even beyond the clandestine actions ofthe Truman years.The propaganda program under Eisenhower thus becamea more stable and institutionalized force in U.S.foreign policy.The USIAessentially became a news organization that masked the intricate and mas-sive covert propaganda activities that were disassociated from the U.S.gov-ernment.Unlike the Truman administration s use of the journalisticparadigm, the USIA sought to disseminate more straight news, devoid ofthe public relations tones of the Smith-Mundt years.Despite the journalisticappearance of the overt channels of propaganda, the entire program as- Propaganda as a Presidential Tool 131sumed a militarized structure.Such a propaganda pyramid of operations al-lowed Eisenhower to serve as commander-in-chief of the propagandaprogram, with the White House functioning as the central command post.Inthe end, this structure served to lessen outside congressional interferenceinto a program that attracted so much attention during the previous sixyears; the restructuring likewise increased the rhetorical power of the presi-dency by giving the administration more control over the content of multi-ple media outlets.ASSESSING THE STATUS OF THE U.S.PROPAGANDAPROGRAMThe Truman administration s propaganda program, despite its more cen-tralized structure, continued to attract considerable criticism from membersof Congress and the new executive branch for failing to achieve its high ex-pectations.On February 19, 1951, Senators Alexander Wiley (R-WI) andWilliam Benton (D-CT) called for yet another study of the propaganda pro-gram with Senate Resolution 74, which passed through Congress on June30, 1952.The first of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearingslasted only two days (November 20 and 2l, 1952) under the chairmanship ofSenator J.William Fulbright (D-AR), and centered on the executive branchof the program s operations.As part of its investigation, this subcommitteeconducted on-the-spot examinations of certain propaganda operationsabroad in a manner reminiscent of the 1947 Smith-Mundt fact-finding mis-sion.The second phase of the Senate Foreign Relations hearings achievedlegislative authority on February 20, 1953, with the passage of Senate Reso-lution 44.The latter represented the Fulbright committee s recommenda-tion to reconvene the subcommittee.Senator Bourke B.Hickenlooper (R-IA)chaired these more extended public hearings, which were designed to ex-plore why the program [was] not meeting the high expectations which[were] held out for it.[and] to recommend remedies [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Davis arguesthat the image of an expansive, subversive force can represent individual andcommunal anxieties over being duped and slipping behind. 89.Information Centers hearing, 44, 50.90.Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy, 198.91.Benton, Europe and Senator McCarthy, 4.92.For information on the effects of the McCarthy committee, see LaurienAlexandre, The Voice of America: From Detente to the Reagan Doctrine (Norwood,NJ: Ablex, 1988), 13; Ambrose, Eisenhower, 61; Dizard, The Strategy of Truth,43; Fried, Men Against McCarthy, 258; Goldston, The American Nightmare,122 123; Oshinsky, A Conspiracy, 278 284; Pirsein, The Voice of America, 246;Reeves, The Life and Times, 491; and Hans N.Tuch, Communicating with theWorld: U.S.Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St.Martin s Press, 1990),18.93.See Brendon, Ike, 276; and Griffith, The Politics of Fear, 196, 200. 6Propaganda as a Presidential Toolin the Eisenhower White HouseIn addition to the McCarthy hearings that centered on the Voice of Americaand the information libraries discussed in chapter 5, there were other con-gressional and executive committees that investigated the U.S.govern-ment s propaganda and psychological warfare operations at the outset ofthe Eisenhower administration.To begin with, the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee turned its attention to the propaganda program in November1952 as well as in March and April 1953.These senators hoped to deter-mine how best to make the peacetime propaganda program a more effectiveCold War instrument.1Accompanying the congressional hearings were two presidentially ap-pointed committee investigations that greatly impacted the future of thepropaganda program.While the scope of the first, the President s AdvisoryCommittee on Government Reorganization (Rockefeller committee), ex-tended beyond the practice of propaganda, it provided a major impetus forremoving the program from the Department of State.The second, which Ei-senhower called the President s Committee on International InformationActivities (Jackson committee), centered exclusively on the propagandaprogram and suggested the most significant programmatic reforms.At thetime of the investigation, the Eisenhower administration determined that no publicity should be given to the [Jackson] Committee or its work, 2with the bulk of its recommendations remaining classified until the 1980s.Since then, however, it has become quite clear that the Jackson committee 130 The Period of Institutionalizationplayed a very significant role in the Eisenhower administration s entire ap-proach to the Cold War.As Blanche Wiesen Cook argues, the committee sactivities influenced United States foreign policy for decades, 3 particu-larly the role of propaganda in relation to U.S.foreign policy.As this chapter shows, all of the investigations eventually helped bringabout the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA)on August 1, 1953.This act removed the program from the Department ofState and awarded propaganda a more prominent and permanent place inthe foreign policy apparatus of the U.S.government.While the structure re-sembled its historical predecessors (e.g., the Committee for Public Infor-mation and the Office of War Information), it became much more central tothe U.S.foreign policy mission during wartime and peacetime.Wilson P.Dizard maintains that the USIA s formation confirmed and cemented thegrowing importance of popular persuasion in foreign policy. 4 As membersof the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) expressed in 1952, nothing ismore important to the President in a critical time of mounting internationaltensions when an accidental bombing could lead to war. 5It was not by accident nor is it surprising that propaganda blossomed un-der Eisenhower s tenure.During World War II, Eisenhower exhibited akeen interest in psychological operations a devotion that grew out of Ei-senhower s desire to avoid conventional warfare.6 Eisenhower s commit-ment to propaganda extended to his appointment of career propagandist, C.D.Jackson, as special assistant to the president, as chief advisor on psycho-logical strategy, and as presidential speech writer.7While the conclusions reached by the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-tee combined with the Rockefeller and McCarthy committees to inspire theindependent status of the U.S.propaganda program, the Jackson committeeencouraged the development of new covert Cold War strategies during theEisenhower administration.Determined to rehabilitate the propaganda pro-gram from the attacks of the McCarthy committee and the problems of theTruman administration s propaganda tactics, this reorganization reducedthe number of propaganda channels openly identified with the U.S.govern-ment and increased secret operations even beyond the clandestine actions ofthe Truman years.The propaganda program under Eisenhower thus becamea more stable and institutionalized force in U.S.foreign policy.The USIAessentially became a news organization that masked the intricate and mas-sive covert propaganda activities that were disassociated from the U.S.gov-ernment.Unlike the Truman administration s use of the journalisticparadigm, the USIA sought to disseminate more straight news, devoid ofthe public relations tones of the Smith-Mundt years.Despite the journalisticappearance of the overt channels of propaganda, the entire program as- Propaganda as a Presidential Tool 131sumed a militarized structure.Such a propaganda pyramid of operations al-lowed Eisenhower to serve as commander-in-chief of the propagandaprogram, with the White House functioning as the central command post.Inthe end, this structure served to lessen outside congressional interferenceinto a program that attracted so much attention during the previous sixyears; the restructuring likewise increased the rhetorical power of the presi-dency by giving the administration more control over the content of multi-ple media outlets.ASSESSING THE STATUS OF THE U.S.PROPAGANDAPROGRAMThe Truman administration s propaganda program, despite its more cen-tralized structure, continued to attract considerable criticism from membersof Congress and the new executive branch for failing to achieve its high ex-pectations.On February 19, 1951, Senators Alexander Wiley (R-WI) andWilliam Benton (D-CT) called for yet another study of the propaganda pro-gram with Senate Resolution 74, which passed through Congress on June30, 1952.The first of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearingslasted only two days (November 20 and 2l, 1952) under the chairmanship ofSenator J.William Fulbright (D-AR), and centered on the executive branchof the program s operations.As part of its investigation, this subcommitteeconducted on-the-spot examinations of certain propaganda operationsabroad in a manner reminiscent of the 1947 Smith-Mundt fact-finding mis-sion.The second phase of the Senate Foreign Relations hearings achievedlegislative authority on February 20, 1953, with the passage of Senate Reso-lution 44.The latter represented the Fulbright committee s recommenda-tion to reconvene the subcommittee.Senator Bourke B.Hickenlooper (R-IA)chaired these more extended public hearings, which were designed to ex-plore why the program [was] not meeting the high expectations which[were] held out for it.[and] to recommend remedies [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]