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.Whatever the American motives in calling for a NATOrole in planning for the defense of Turkey, Germany s decision to refusethat role was deeply damaging to the notion of NATO as a defensealliance on which its members could rely.For over 50 years no countryhad benefited more from that understanding of NATO than Germanyitself.Some of the German rhetoric during the run-up to war, and espe-cially during Schröder s political campaign, was also distinctlyunhelpful it paralleled and contributed to the anti-Europeanrhetoric heard in the United States.Schröder appeared to discoverduring the campaign not only that his antiwar stance was winninghim support, but that he did even better when attacking Bush person-ally.Thus Schröder not only did nothing to counter the widespreadview in the German public and press that Bush was a trigger-happycowboy who only wanted Iraq s oil, he actively encouraged and tookadvantage of that view.The climate created was one in which the justice minister s com-parison of Bush to Hitler was only a particularly egregious and worsefor her, public example of the general tone of the German debate.Schröder s response to that insult to the President a letter to Bushthat essentially said, I m sorry you chose to be offended by somethingmy minister did not say might not have merited the highly person-alized American response it got, but it was deeply inept.More impor-tant, the letter hardly seemed to be the response of a leader who caredabout his relationship with the President of the United States or theenduring health of the Atlantic alliance.In short, German policy the denunciation of American adven-tures, the refusal to back even a UN-sponsored military action, and theobjection even to NATO s planning for the defense of an ally was agift to the hard-liners and unilateralists in the American administra-tion.If Europeans, the thinking went, especially those on the SecurityCouncil, were unprepared to enforce UN Security Council resolutions,176 THE VICIOUS CIRCLEimplement NATO defense guarantees, or take seriously the issue ofWMD proliferation, why should the United States agree to take seri-ously their argument to act through international institutions?French policy was even more damaging to the concept of alliance.French arguments against the war derived at least in part from legiti-mate and reasoned principles.They were not merely the result of com-mercial interests, a reflexive desire to resist American power, or anunwillingness to face up to genuine threats.Like most Europeans,much of the world, and many Americans, the French feared that a waron Iraq could undermine the war on terrorism, destabilize the region,provoke the use of weapons of mass destruction, and lead to a difficult,costly, and possibly futile occupation of Iraq.Some of those concernshave proven unfounded, but others appear to have been validated byevents.Certainly, the bloody, expensive, and uncertain experience ofoccupying Iraq has shown that French fears of the consequences of aninvasion were not simply the product of anti-American fantasies.But opposing the war was a different matter from opposing theUnited States particularly after it had become clear that Washingtonwas going to act.However arrogant and even misguided Americanpolicies might have been, they did not merit France s all out attempt todeny legitimacy to the operation once it had been decided.The Frenchposition that they would only support military action in Iraq if it wasauthorized by the UN Security Council was disingenuous given that, inthe event, France itself held the key to that authorization.The Frenchargument that containment and weapons inspections might have beena better policy course to pursue than a full-scale invasion and occupa-tion of Iraq was not unreasonable.Nonetheless, Paris agreed in the fallof 2002 to a UN Security Council resolution obliging France to support serious consequences if Iraq failed to fully comply with that resolu-tion, which even Paris acknowledged Iraq had not done.It was perfect-ly acceptable for France to conclude, as did many other countries, thateven at that point force should not have been used.But without having177 ALLIES AT WARdeployed a single soldier to the Gulf region to reinforce the threat ofaction, for Paris to use its position on the Security Council to preventthe Americans from acting in those circumstances was not the act ofan ally [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.Whatever the American motives in calling for a NATOrole in planning for the defense of Turkey, Germany s decision to refusethat role was deeply damaging to the notion of NATO as a defensealliance on which its members could rely.For over 50 years no countryhad benefited more from that understanding of NATO than Germanyitself.Some of the German rhetoric during the run-up to war, and espe-cially during Schröder s political campaign, was also distinctlyunhelpful it paralleled and contributed to the anti-Europeanrhetoric heard in the United States.Schröder appeared to discoverduring the campaign not only that his antiwar stance was winninghim support, but that he did even better when attacking Bush person-ally.Thus Schröder not only did nothing to counter the widespreadview in the German public and press that Bush was a trigger-happycowboy who only wanted Iraq s oil, he actively encouraged and tookadvantage of that view.The climate created was one in which the justice minister s com-parison of Bush to Hitler was only a particularly egregious and worsefor her, public example of the general tone of the German debate.Schröder s response to that insult to the President a letter to Bushthat essentially said, I m sorry you chose to be offended by somethingmy minister did not say might not have merited the highly person-alized American response it got, but it was deeply inept.More impor-tant, the letter hardly seemed to be the response of a leader who caredabout his relationship with the President of the United States or theenduring health of the Atlantic alliance.In short, German policy the denunciation of American adven-tures, the refusal to back even a UN-sponsored military action, and theobjection even to NATO s planning for the defense of an ally was agift to the hard-liners and unilateralists in the American administra-tion.If Europeans, the thinking went, especially those on the SecurityCouncil, were unprepared to enforce UN Security Council resolutions,176 THE VICIOUS CIRCLEimplement NATO defense guarantees, or take seriously the issue ofWMD proliferation, why should the United States agree to take seri-ously their argument to act through international institutions?French policy was even more damaging to the concept of alliance.French arguments against the war derived at least in part from legiti-mate and reasoned principles.They were not merely the result of com-mercial interests, a reflexive desire to resist American power, or anunwillingness to face up to genuine threats.Like most Europeans,much of the world, and many Americans, the French feared that a waron Iraq could undermine the war on terrorism, destabilize the region,provoke the use of weapons of mass destruction, and lead to a difficult,costly, and possibly futile occupation of Iraq.Some of those concernshave proven unfounded, but others appear to have been validated byevents.Certainly, the bloody, expensive, and uncertain experience ofoccupying Iraq has shown that French fears of the consequences of aninvasion were not simply the product of anti-American fantasies.But opposing the war was a different matter from opposing theUnited States particularly after it had become clear that Washingtonwas going to act.However arrogant and even misguided Americanpolicies might have been, they did not merit France s all out attempt todeny legitimacy to the operation once it had been decided.The Frenchposition that they would only support military action in Iraq if it wasauthorized by the UN Security Council was disingenuous given that, inthe event, France itself held the key to that authorization.The Frenchargument that containment and weapons inspections might have beena better policy course to pursue than a full-scale invasion and occupa-tion of Iraq was not unreasonable.Nonetheless, Paris agreed in the fallof 2002 to a UN Security Council resolution obliging France to support serious consequences if Iraq failed to fully comply with that resolu-tion, which even Paris acknowledged Iraq had not done.It was perfect-ly acceptable for France to conclude, as did many other countries, thateven at that point force should not have been used.But without having177 ALLIES AT WARdeployed a single soldier to the Gulf region to reinforce the threat ofaction, for Paris to use its position on the Security Council to preventthe Americans from acting in those circumstances was not the act ofan ally [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]