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.Eventually, as mem-bers continued to be replaced, the norm drifted downward to match the natural range of distance norms established by groups with no confeder-ates.The researchers interpreted their results as demonstrating that cul-tural transmission of an arbitrary norm can survive the total replacement ofall group members.However, their results also showed the eventual aban-donment of an arbitrary norm that differed from individual observations.Ineffect, their experiment demonstrated both cultural persistence and somelimits on persistence for the generational transmission of a social realitynorm (McGrath, 1984, p.201), which is a shared interpretation of reality.A decade after the Jacobs and Campbell study, Weick and Gilfallan (1971)examined the cultural transmission of a situational norm (McGrath, 1984),which specifies rules for behavior in a specific class of situations.Theychose a new task, the target game, that explicitly required groups of peopleto coordinate their actions to achieve a collective goal.They were inter-ested in whether the persistence of a cultural practice (an assigned strat-egy for playing the target game) would differ based on whether an arbi-trarily chosen strategy was more or less difficult to implement.Chartermembers of each group were instructed in a strategy (the assigned norm).TLFeBOOK 186 ARROW AND BURNSIn the target game, the experimenter calls out a target number between 0and 30, and the three members of a group must try to hit that target by in-dependently (and privately) contributing a number between 0 and 10.Theexperimenter tallies and reports to group members the results of each trial;no direct communication among group members is allowed.The group issuccessful if the sum of the three contributions equals the target number.After a group completed 24 trials, one member was removed and replacedwith a new person who had not been trained in a strategy.After the recon-figured group completed 24 trials, another member was replaced, and thisprocedure was repeated for 11 generations.The difficulty of the assigned strategy made a difference in how long theassigned situational norm endured.The easy assigned strategy persistedunchanged.The difficult normative strategy, however, was abandoned bythe fourth generation, and replaced (in most cases) by an easier emergentstrategy.The stability of the situational norm thus depended on how welladapted it was to the demands placed on the group.Together, the group experiments just described demonstrate the feasi-bility of investigating the formation and transmission of cultural elementssuch as beliefs and social practices in the microculture of small groups.They show that group norms (a) emerge among people with initially diver-gent views, (b) are internalized by group members, (c) differ across groups,and (d) are transmitted to new members across multiple generations of thegroup.They also demonstrate that problematic norms (e) change over timeto either match the preferences of members more closely or match thestructure of the environment more effectively.The experimental studies just described did not allow group members tointeract freely.When studying the emergence of a social reality norm, inwhich simply hearing the views of others can help shape one s own opin-ions about what is true, this is a reasonable constraint.The paradigms arealso well suited for the study of what Opp (1982) called evolutionary normformation, in which norms emerge implicitly, in an unplanned and unin-tended manner.According to Opp, norms can also form when institutionsprescribe behaviors (institutional norm formation), or when people explic-itly discuss appropriate behavior (voluntary norm formation).In the Weickand Gilfallan study, the normative strategy for playing the target game wasimposed top down by the experimenters, an institutional process.In contrast, voluntary and evolutionary norm formation are both bottom-up processes, one implicit, the other explicit.After the groups that weretaught a difficult strategy for the target game abandoned it, a new, easierstrategy emerged following the evolutionary route (Weick & Gillfallan, 1971,p.188).The process depended on trial and error because group memberswere not allowed to communicate directly.Instead they had to feel their waytoward a new strategy by acting, seeing the results, and making adjustments.TLFeBOOK 8.SELF-ORGANIZING CULTURE 187Our multilevel framework integrates the three routes of norm formation,and suggests how they might interact.Evolutionary norm formation is theemergence of global structure from interpersonal interaction.The arrowthus goes from lower level to higher level, and is similar to the processmodeled by the conformity game developed by Latané and colleagues.Vol-untary norms emerge from group discussion and negotiation, and subse-quently guide member behavior.This involves the influence both of individ-uals on the group and the group on its members.Institutional norms arehanded down from the embedding context (band or larger aggregate).We view the three routes of norm formation as snapshots of a largerprocess.Coordinated behavior emerges from local interaction, which is it-self shaped by context and constrained by individual-level mechanisms thatsupply content and guide social behavior.These patterns percolate upwardto the embedding context through diffusion to other groups, and can thenbecome standardized and subsequently imposed on other groups via theinstitutional route [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.Eventually, as mem-bers continued to be replaced, the norm drifted downward to match the natural range of distance norms established by groups with no confeder-ates.The researchers interpreted their results as demonstrating that cul-tural transmission of an arbitrary norm can survive the total replacement ofall group members.However, their results also showed the eventual aban-donment of an arbitrary norm that differed from individual observations.Ineffect, their experiment demonstrated both cultural persistence and somelimits on persistence for the generational transmission of a social realitynorm (McGrath, 1984, p.201), which is a shared interpretation of reality.A decade after the Jacobs and Campbell study, Weick and Gilfallan (1971)examined the cultural transmission of a situational norm (McGrath, 1984),which specifies rules for behavior in a specific class of situations.Theychose a new task, the target game, that explicitly required groups of peopleto coordinate their actions to achieve a collective goal.They were inter-ested in whether the persistence of a cultural practice (an assigned strat-egy for playing the target game) would differ based on whether an arbi-trarily chosen strategy was more or less difficult to implement.Chartermembers of each group were instructed in a strategy (the assigned norm).TLFeBOOK 186 ARROW AND BURNSIn the target game, the experimenter calls out a target number between 0and 30, and the three members of a group must try to hit that target by in-dependently (and privately) contributing a number between 0 and 10.Theexperimenter tallies and reports to group members the results of each trial;no direct communication among group members is allowed.The group issuccessful if the sum of the three contributions equals the target number.After a group completed 24 trials, one member was removed and replacedwith a new person who had not been trained in a strategy.After the recon-figured group completed 24 trials, another member was replaced, and thisprocedure was repeated for 11 generations.The difficulty of the assigned strategy made a difference in how long theassigned situational norm endured.The easy assigned strategy persistedunchanged.The difficult normative strategy, however, was abandoned bythe fourth generation, and replaced (in most cases) by an easier emergentstrategy.The stability of the situational norm thus depended on how welladapted it was to the demands placed on the group.Together, the group experiments just described demonstrate the feasi-bility of investigating the formation and transmission of cultural elementssuch as beliefs and social practices in the microculture of small groups.They show that group norms (a) emerge among people with initially diver-gent views, (b) are internalized by group members, (c) differ across groups,and (d) are transmitted to new members across multiple generations of thegroup.They also demonstrate that problematic norms (e) change over timeto either match the preferences of members more closely or match thestructure of the environment more effectively.The experimental studies just described did not allow group members tointeract freely.When studying the emergence of a social reality norm, inwhich simply hearing the views of others can help shape one s own opin-ions about what is true, this is a reasonable constraint.The paradigms arealso well suited for the study of what Opp (1982) called evolutionary normformation, in which norms emerge implicitly, in an unplanned and unin-tended manner.According to Opp, norms can also form when institutionsprescribe behaviors (institutional norm formation), or when people explic-itly discuss appropriate behavior (voluntary norm formation).In the Weickand Gilfallan study, the normative strategy for playing the target game wasimposed top down by the experimenters, an institutional process.In contrast, voluntary and evolutionary norm formation are both bottom-up processes, one implicit, the other explicit.After the groups that weretaught a difficult strategy for the target game abandoned it, a new, easierstrategy emerged following the evolutionary route (Weick & Gillfallan, 1971,p.188).The process depended on trial and error because group memberswere not allowed to communicate directly.Instead they had to feel their waytoward a new strategy by acting, seeing the results, and making adjustments.TLFeBOOK 8.SELF-ORGANIZING CULTURE 187Our multilevel framework integrates the three routes of norm formation,and suggests how they might interact.Evolutionary norm formation is theemergence of global structure from interpersonal interaction.The arrowthus goes from lower level to higher level, and is similar to the processmodeled by the conformity game developed by Latané and colleagues.Vol-untary norms emerge from group discussion and negotiation, and subse-quently guide member behavior.This involves the influence both of individ-uals on the group and the group on its members.Institutional norms arehanded down from the embedding context (band or larger aggregate).We view the three routes of norm formation as snapshots of a largerprocess.Coordinated behavior emerges from local interaction, which is it-self shaped by context and constrained by individual-level mechanisms thatsupply content and guide social behavior.These patterns percolate upwardto the embedding context through diffusion to other groups, and can thenbecome standardized and subsequently imposed on other groups via theinstitutional route [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]