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.By 1890 the corporate revolution in manufacturing was probably inevi-table in some form, although exactly what form was not entirely clear.Theresources concentrated in the corporate institutions were vast and the op-portunities to profit from railroad and related sectors diminishing, so inves-tors were looking for new outlets.The legal foundation, insofar as it wasbased on the railroad as a profit-making company rather than a commoncarrier accountable to the public, could easily be borrowed by manufactur-ing.And manufacturers opposition to corporate takeover was alreadyweakened by the frequent declaration that big business was inevitable, bythe temptations of monopolistic profits, and by the trauma inflicted by theGreat Depression of 1893.Belief in the corporate revolution s inevitabilityhas led to its treatment as fairly unproblematic in most conventional ac-counts, which tell how in the 1880s industrialists like John D.Rockefellerin oil and Henry O.Havemeyer in sugar, after failing to control competitionthrough pools, formed trusts, whereby each constituent firm incorporatedfor the purpose of exchanging corporate stock for trust certificates, allow-ing a central board to control entire industries.After the trusts were de-clared illegal, industries reorganized in holding companies like Standard Oilor the American Sugar Refining Company.At the end of the 1890s hun-dreds of such corporations were founded primarily through mergers by fi-nanciers like J.P.Morgan, who organized General Electric, InternationalHarvester, and U.S.Steel.But such accounts too often neglect how the na-ture and definition of property, the organization and distribution of wealth,and the institutional practices and definitions were all socially constructedand far from inevitable.My account focuses on explaining these broaderfactors, emphasizing that they were determined less by the exigencies ofeconomic efficiency or managerial rationality than by the very political dy-namics of power.PREVIEWThis chapter sets the conceptual stage for the story that follows.Chapter 2puts efficiency theory to an empirical test and finds it wanting, validatingthe need for an alternative account.The next three chapters describe howthe corporate system was historically constructed, growing into the basicforms it continues to have today but remaining rigidly confined to a fewsectors of the economy.Chapter 3 reviews the early business corporation inAmerica, emphasizing the active role of government in creating corpora-tions whose political purposes explain what were later labeled inherentfeatures, features that purportedly made corporations more efficient.I also I N T R O D U C T I O N 19describe how the line between public and private power was historicallyconstructed and not a matter of natural division of labor.Chapter 4 focuseson the transition from the publicly accountable corporation to the corpora-tion as a form of private property, especially in large railroad corporations.Chapter 5 shows how the institutional structure of investment banks, bro-kerage houses, stock exchanges, and other organizations arose around gov-ernment and public corporations, remaining apart from manufacturingeven when well developed.The final four chapters address the corporaterevolution itself.Chapter 6 discusses the legal definition of corporate prop-erty, the specific rights, entitlements, and obligations that structured the re-lationships that constituted economic interaction, and how it created a dis-tinctly new form of property that varied among the individual Americanstates.Chapter 7 describes the interaction of manufacturers and the stateover the way in which manufacturers would govern themselves, leading tothe first generation of large-scale socially capitalized firms like the AmericanCotton Oil Company and the American Sugar Refining Company.Chapter8 presents the climax of the story, with the leading actors in manufacturingand banking in simultaneous conflict and cooperation, transforming manu-facturing in the corporate revolution.The Conclusion explores implicationsfor both social theory and contemporary change.Along the way I focus onthree states, since most of the action, especially concerning the role of gov-ernment, took place on the state rather than the national level.9 New Jerseywas known as the home of the trusts because its permissive corporatelaws made it possible to organize capital into very large holding companies,precipitating the corporate revolution.Ohio occupied the other end of thespectrum, a state whose rigorous laws demanded more public accountabil-ity than most large corporations were willing to tolerate.Pennsylvania tooka middle course, perhaps the most typical but the least fascinating.Thethree of them together offer a representative view of how large corporationsarose and changed.CONCLUSIONIf the concepts of property, power, and institution are intimately connected,theoretical perspectives conventionally considered rivals can be synthesized.Insofar as class relations become embedded within institutions, class theoryand neo-institutionalization theory can both explain the outcome.I will em-phasize the important role that investment banks, stock markets, and bro-kerage houses played in the rise and spread of large corporations.More-over, to the extent that institutions are shaped by the actions of somegroups exerting power over others, political sociology and neo-institution-alization theory must speak to each other [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.By 1890 the corporate revolution in manufacturing was probably inevi-table in some form, although exactly what form was not entirely clear.Theresources concentrated in the corporate institutions were vast and the op-portunities to profit from railroad and related sectors diminishing, so inves-tors were looking for new outlets.The legal foundation, insofar as it wasbased on the railroad as a profit-making company rather than a commoncarrier accountable to the public, could easily be borrowed by manufactur-ing.And manufacturers opposition to corporate takeover was alreadyweakened by the frequent declaration that big business was inevitable, bythe temptations of monopolistic profits, and by the trauma inflicted by theGreat Depression of 1893.Belief in the corporate revolution s inevitabilityhas led to its treatment as fairly unproblematic in most conventional ac-counts, which tell how in the 1880s industrialists like John D.Rockefellerin oil and Henry O.Havemeyer in sugar, after failing to control competitionthrough pools, formed trusts, whereby each constituent firm incorporatedfor the purpose of exchanging corporate stock for trust certificates, allow-ing a central board to control entire industries.After the trusts were de-clared illegal, industries reorganized in holding companies like Standard Oilor the American Sugar Refining Company.At the end of the 1890s hun-dreds of such corporations were founded primarily through mergers by fi-nanciers like J.P.Morgan, who organized General Electric, InternationalHarvester, and U.S.Steel.But such accounts too often neglect how the na-ture and definition of property, the organization and distribution of wealth,and the institutional practices and definitions were all socially constructedand far from inevitable.My account focuses on explaining these broaderfactors, emphasizing that they were determined less by the exigencies ofeconomic efficiency or managerial rationality than by the very political dy-namics of power.PREVIEWThis chapter sets the conceptual stage for the story that follows.Chapter 2puts efficiency theory to an empirical test and finds it wanting, validatingthe need for an alternative account.The next three chapters describe howthe corporate system was historically constructed, growing into the basicforms it continues to have today but remaining rigidly confined to a fewsectors of the economy.Chapter 3 reviews the early business corporation inAmerica, emphasizing the active role of government in creating corpora-tions whose political purposes explain what were later labeled inherentfeatures, features that purportedly made corporations more efficient.I also I N T R O D U C T I O N 19describe how the line between public and private power was historicallyconstructed and not a matter of natural division of labor.Chapter 4 focuseson the transition from the publicly accountable corporation to the corpora-tion as a form of private property, especially in large railroad corporations.Chapter 5 shows how the institutional structure of investment banks, bro-kerage houses, stock exchanges, and other organizations arose around gov-ernment and public corporations, remaining apart from manufacturingeven when well developed.The final four chapters address the corporaterevolution itself.Chapter 6 discusses the legal definition of corporate prop-erty, the specific rights, entitlements, and obligations that structured the re-lationships that constituted economic interaction, and how it created a dis-tinctly new form of property that varied among the individual Americanstates.Chapter 7 describes the interaction of manufacturers and the stateover the way in which manufacturers would govern themselves, leading tothe first generation of large-scale socially capitalized firms like the AmericanCotton Oil Company and the American Sugar Refining Company.Chapter8 presents the climax of the story, with the leading actors in manufacturingand banking in simultaneous conflict and cooperation, transforming manu-facturing in the corporate revolution.The Conclusion explores implicationsfor both social theory and contemporary change.Along the way I focus onthree states, since most of the action, especially concerning the role of gov-ernment, took place on the state rather than the national level.9 New Jerseywas known as the home of the trusts because its permissive corporatelaws made it possible to organize capital into very large holding companies,precipitating the corporate revolution.Ohio occupied the other end of thespectrum, a state whose rigorous laws demanded more public accountabil-ity than most large corporations were willing to tolerate.Pennsylvania tooka middle course, perhaps the most typical but the least fascinating.Thethree of them together offer a representative view of how large corporationsarose and changed.CONCLUSIONIf the concepts of property, power, and institution are intimately connected,theoretical perspectives conventionally considered rivals can be synthesized.Insofar as class relations become embedded within institutions, class theoryand neo-institutionalization theory can both explain the outcome.I will em-phasize the important role that investment banks, stock markets, and bro-kerage houses played in the rise and spread of large corporations.More-over, to the extent that institutions are shaped by the actions of somegroups exerting power over others, political sociology and neo-institution-alization theory must speak to each other [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]