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.veconnect.com - licensed to“Try as we might, there is ultimately very little that we can do to alter the early life-experiences that make some boys criminally “at risk.” Neither can we do much.palgrato rehabilitate them once they have crossed the prison gates.Let us, therefore, do what we can to deter them by means of strict criminal sanctions, and, where deter-om wwwrence fails, to incapacitate them.Let the government Leviathan Lock them up and, when prudence dictates, throw away the key.” (Dilulio 1996a:3)”In “The coming of the super-predators” (1995), Dilulio announced to Amer-ica a “new wave” of juvenile criminals that would terrorize the nation by 2000.yright material frThe cause of this soon-to-arrive youth crisis was the drastic increase in the urbanCopyouth population, specifically black and Chicano youth, many of whom were “still in diapers.” Without a new punitive juvenile justice policy, they would inevitably carry out a “bloodbath” of violence.3Pushing the superpredator thesis a step further, former U.S.Secretary of Education William Bennett, along with Dilulio, coauthored Body count: Moral poverty and how to win America’s war against crime and drugs (1996).They introduced the idea of “moral poverty.” According to Bennett and Dilulio, “moral poverty” is the failure of parents and the local community to provide children with appropriate 10.1057/9780230101470 - Behind Bars, Edited by Suzanne Obolerpal-oboler-04.indd 101pal-oboler-04.indd 1019/15/09 1:21 PM9/15/09 1:21 PM102 VICTOR M.RIOStraining in becoming law-abiding, hardworking, “moral” individuals.According to them, moral poverty stems from the increase in single-parent households and homes where one or more of the parents are “deviant” or “criminal” themselves.Specifically, the authors argue that “in the extreme, it is the poverty of growing up surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults in a practically perfect criminogenic environment—that is, an environment that seems almost consciously designed to produce vicious, unrepentant predatory street criminals, that repeats the cycle” (14).As a solution to moral poverty, they argued for throwing out the idea of juvenile justice as rehabilitative and replacing it with a system that spoke to the problem of moral poverty.Under their proposed system, young people would pay “a price for transgressing the rights of others.” Bennet and Dilulio argued that rehabilitation programs were responsible for rewarding, rather than punishing, negative behavior among youth and were therefore merely perpetuating the cycle of moralveConnect - 2011-05-06poverty.The superpredator thesis exacerbated the youth crime problem, leadingalgrato the hypercriminalization of black and Latino youth (Rios 2006).Proposition 21serves as an extension of this draconian philosophy.tium - PTurning Delinquency into Serious CrimeProponents of Proposition 21 constructed a discourse that converted juvenile delin-aiwan eBook ConsorTquency—particularly deviance acted out by youth of color—as a serious criminal threat to society.Proponents of Proposition 21 consistently conflated serious crime (i.e., violence, murder, brutality, shooting, drive-bys) with delinquency (i.e., graffiti, gang involvement, defiance, truancy, theft).Fifty-one percent of phrases coded for“delinquency” or “serious crime” were entangled, blurring the lines between serious crime and juvenile delinquency.Only 22 percent of all phrases that discussed delinquency referenced it in isolation from serious crime.For phrases that referredveconnect.com - licensed toto serious crime, only 28 percent discussed it in isolation from delinquency.The words of former California Governor Pete Wilson, the creator of Proposi-.palgration 21, serve as a crucial example of this discursive conflation.On the heels of the superpredator discourse, Wilson announced in 1994 that “a new and violentom wwwupsurge in juvenile crime” was on the Californian horizon.If delinquent youth could be constructed as “irreparable criminals” in the making, then harsh policies that would “incapacitate” them could be implemented to deal with the problem.Even before his formal campaign against youth crime, Wilson had always insistedyright material frthat youth offenders be punished harshly for their transgressions: “But while weCopsympathize with children who are tempted by drugs or gangs when, as teenagers or adults, they victimize others, our sympathy must yield to responsibility.we must insist on adult time for adult crime.(Wilson 1994; emphasis added)”Wilson’s solution to this constructed problem was to present voters, who were already in fear of juvenile crime at the time (Males 1998; Elikann 1999; Parenti 2000), with Proposition 21.This act set the stage for a new era of juvenile justice in California that formalized severe punishment for youth offenders.Proposition 21 brought about three major changes in the way juveniles were sentenced in the courts: 10.1057/9780230101470 - Behind Bars, Edited by Suzanne Obolerpal-oboler-04.indd 102pal-oboler-04.indd 1029/15/09 1:21 PM9/15/09 1:21 PMTHE RACIAL POLITICS OF YOUTH CRIME 1031.It allowed prosecutors to try juveniles as adults when they had committed major crimes.2.It raised the stakes on crimes once considered youthful and therefore misdemeanor, such as graffiti and vandalism, now considered felonies.3.It provided the court the power to grant “enhancements,” or added sen-tences, for being involved in a gang.Proposition 21 intended to systematically attack the California youth violence and gang “crisis.” According to Wilson, a “drastic” increase in gang activity and youth violence led him to develop this measure.Although the proposition was advertised by proponents as targeting “the irredeemable, those violent criminals, whether they be juveniles or gang members, that cannot be redeemed throughprevention and education” (Pacheco 2000), most of its changes focused on nonvi-veConnect - 2011-05-06olent juvenile delinquency.These changes included charging gang members with conspiracy to commit a felony if their gang committed a crime, even if the indi-algravidual had no part in planning or carrying out the deed; requiring gang-involvedtium - Pdelinquents to register with their county as “gang members”; and creating a six-month minimum sentence for misdemeanors committed as a gang member.Wilson insisted that today’s (majority nonwhite) juvenile delinquents were different than those (majority white) juvenile delinquents of the early twentieth century:aiwan eBook ConsorToday’s juvenile justice system was designed in the 1940’s, when “serious” youthToffenses included truancy, curfew violations and fistfights, and was intended to deal with “juvenile delinquents” whose most serious offenses where petty theft and vandalism.It was never intended or designed to handle gang murderers with semi-automatic weapons or rapists preying upon innocent women [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.veconnect.com - licensed to“Try as we might, there is ultimately very little that we can do to alter the early life-experiences that make some boys criminally “at risk.” Neither can we do much.palgrato rehabilitate them once they have crossed the prison gates.Let us, therefore, do what we can to deter them by means of strict criminal sanctions, and, where deter-om wwwrence fails, to incapacitate them.Let the government Leviathan Lock them up and, when prudence dictates, throw away the key.” (Dilulio 1996a:3)”In “The coming of the super-predators” (1995), Dilulio announced to Amer-ica a “new wave” of juvenile criminals that would terrorize the nation by 2000.yright material frThe cause of this soon-to-arrive youth crisis was the drastic increase in the urbanCopyouth population, specifically black and Chicano youth, many of whom were “still in diapers.” Without a new punitive juvenile justice policy, they would inevitably carry out a “bloodbath” of violence.3Pushing the superpredator thesis a step further, former U.S.Secretary of Education William Bennett, along with Dilulio, coauthored Body count: Moral poverty and how to win America’s war against crime and drugs (1996).They introduced the idea of “moral poverty.” According to Bennett and Dilulio, “moral poverty” is the failure of parents and the local community to provide children with appropriate 10.1057/9780230101470 - Behind Bars, Edited by Suzanne Obolerpal-oboler-04.indd 101pal-oboler-04.indd 1019/15/09 1:21 PM9/15/09 1:21 PM102 VICTOR M.RIOStraining in becoming law-abiding, hardworking, “moral” individuals.According to them, moral poverty stems from the increase in single-parent households and homes where one or more of the parents are “deviant” or “criminal” themselves.Specifically, the authors argue that “in the extreme, it is the poverty of growing up surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults in a practically perfect criminogenic environment—that is, an environment that seems almost consciously designed to produce vicious, unrepentant predatory street criminals, that repeats the cycle” (14).As a solution to moral poverty, they argued for throwing out the idea of juvenile justice as rehabilitative and replacing it with a system that spoke to the problem of moral poverty.Under their proposed system, young people would pay “a price for transgressing the rights of others.” Bennet and Dilulio argued that rehabilitation programs were responsible for rewarding, rather than punishing, negative behavior among youth and were therefore merely perpetuating the cycle of moralveConnect - 2011-05-06poverty.The superpredator thesis exacerbated the youth crime problem, leadingalgrato the hypercriminalization of black and Latino youth (Rios 2006).Proposition 21serves as an extension of this draconian philosophy.tium - PTurning Delinquency into Serious CrimeProponents of Proposition 21 constructed a discourse that converted juvenile delin-aiwan eBook ConsorTquency—particularly deviance acted out by youth of color—as a serious criminal threat to society.Proponents of Proposition 21 consistently conflated serious crime (i.e., violence, murder, brutality, shooting, drive-bys) with delinquency (i.e., graffiti, gang involvement, defiance, truancy, theft).Fifty-one percent of phrases coded for“delinquency” or “serious crime” were entangled, blurring the lines between serious crime and juvenile delinquency.Only 22 percent of all phrases that discussed delinquency referenced it in isolation from serious crime.For phrases that referredveconnect.com - licensed toto serious crime, only 28 percent discussed it in isolation from delinquency.The words of former California Governor Pete Wilson, the creator of Proposi-.palgration 21, serve as a crucial example of this discursive conflation.On the heels of the superpredator discourse, Wilson announced in 1994 that “a new and violentom wwwupsurge in juvenile crime” was on the Californian horizon.If delinquent youth could be constructed as “irreparable criminals” in the making, then harsh policies that would “incapacitate” them could be implemented to deal with the problem.Even before his formal campaign against youth crime, Wilson had always insistedyright material frthat youth offenders be punished harshly for their transgressions: “But while weCopsympathize with children who are tempted by drugs or gangs when, as teenagers or adults, they victimize others, our sympathy must yield to responsibility.we must insist on adult time for adult crime.(Wilson 1994; emphasis added)”Wilson’s solution to this constructed problem was to present voters, who were already in fear of juvenile crime at the time (Males 1998; Elikann 1999; Parenti 2000), with Proposition 21.This act set the stage for a new era of juvenile justice in California that formalized severe punishment for youth offenders.Proposition 21 brought about three major changes in the way juveniles were sentenced in the courts: 10.1057/9780230101470 - Behind Bars, Edited by Suzanne Obolerpal-oboler-04.indd 102pal-oboler-04.indd 1029/15/09 1:21 PM9/15/09 1:21 PMTHE RACIAL POLITICS OF YOUTH CRIME 1031.It allowed prosecutors to try juveniles as adults when they had committed major crimes.2.It raised the stakes on crimes once considered youthful and therefore misdemeanor, such as graffiti and vandalism, now considered felonies.3.It provided the court the power to grant “enhancements,” or added sen-tences, for being involved in a gang.Proposition 21 intended to systematically attack the California youth violence and gang “crisis.” According to Wilson, a “drastic” increase in gang activity and youth violence led him to develop this measure.Although the proposition was advertised by proponents as targeting “the irredeemable, those violent criminals, whether they be juveniles or gang members, that cannot be redeemed throughprevention and education” (Pacheco 2000), most of its changes focused on nonvi-veConnect - 2011-05-06olent juvenile delinquency.These changes included charging gang members with conspiracy to commit a felony if their gang committed a crime, even if the indi-algravidual had no part in planning or carrying out the deed; requiring gang-involvedtium - Pdelinquents to register with their county as “gang members”; and creating a six-month minimum sentence for misdemeanors committed as a gang member.Wilson insisted that today’s (majority nonwhite) juvenile delinquents were different than those (majority white) juvenile delinquents of the early twentieth century:aiwan eBook ConsorToday’s juvenile justice system was designed in the 1940’s, when “serious” youthToffenses included truancy, curfew violations and fistfights, and was intended to deal with “juvenile delinquents” whose most serious offenses where petty theft and vandalism.It was never intended or designed to handle gang murderers with semi-automatic weapons or rapists preying upon innocent women [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]