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.49 q.2, a.1, ad10. Secundum autem quod intelligitres alias, intellectum in actu fit unum cum intellectu in actu, inquantum forma intellectifit forma intellectus, inquantum est intellectus in actu. 23Summa theologiae I, q.85, a.2, ad 1. Thomas Aquinas 297Despite positing these similitudes in the mind, Aquinas always insiststhat what we know first and foremost is the thing itself, not any of theintermediary likenesses.We do not infer the thing from what we know inthe mind; we know the thing directly.An entire article, Summa theologiaeI, q.85, a 2, is explicitly devoted to the question whether the intelligiblespecies is what we know, and Aquinas s answer is clear: That which isfirst known (intelligitur) is the thing of which the intelligible species isa similitude. In De veritate, q.3 a.2, Aquinas spells this out even moreclearly.He says that the similitudes definitely are not that which weknow; rather, they are that by which we know the thing directly.Concerning the intelligible species, he says, We see that the species, bywhich the intellect is informed in order that it can actually understand,is the first by which (primum quo) a thing is known. Then he goes on tospeak about the internal word (whether quiddity or judgment): Thequiddity that is formed in the intellect, or even the composition anddivision, is a certain product of [the intellect], through which theintellect arrives at the cognition of the exterior thing; and thus it is, as itwere, a second by which (secundum quo) a thing is known. 24 There isa first quo and then a second quo, and we must traverse both of them.There is a lot of mirroring going on here, even as we directly know thething in question.Aquinas is saying all the right things; he insists thatwe directly know the thing and not its likenesses in us; but it still seemsthat he is courting danger when he says, in this passage, that there aretwo such likenesses by which we know, first the received intelligiblespecies and second the generated internal word.I would also like todraw attention to the term quondam operatum ipsius, a certain product of[the intellect], which Aquinas uses to designate the internal word; thisis a strong term, which clearly makes the internal word rather thick asa representation.Aquinas says, therefore, that what we directly know is the thing, not thelikeness by which we know it.He does say that we can secondarily knowthe likeness as well.We do so when we reflect on our minds and ourintellectual activities, or rather when the mind reflects on itself.Speakingabout the intelligible species, Aquinas says, But because the intellectreflects on itself, according to that reflection it understands both its ownknowing and the species by which it knows.Thus, the intellectual species is24De veritate, q.3, a.2: Videmus quod species, qua intellectus informatur ut intelligat actu,est primum quo intelligitur; ex hoc autem quod est effectus in actu, per talem formamoperari iam potest formando quidditates rerum et componendo et dividendo; unde ipsaquidditas formata in intellectu, vel etiam compositio et divisio, est quoddam operatumipsius, per quod tamen intellectus venit in cognitionem rei exterioris; et sic est quasisecundum quo intelligitur. See Floucat, L intime fécondité de l intelligence, 73. 298 Ancients and Modernssecondarily that which is known. 25 Aquinas does not spell out thisreflective knowledge, but clearly it would not be a perception, since thespecies is not a perceivable thing, nor would it seem to involve any directintuition of the species.Aquinas s insistence that the thing we directly know is the thing itselfand not an idea of the thing is reassuring, but the constant use of theterm similitudes for intelligible species, concepts, judgments, and evenarguments does seem to substantialize them to an uncomfortable degree.As Bernardo Carlos Bazán says, with this doctrine Thomas inauguratesa kind of thought through intermediaries whose problems are enormous. 26Descartes and Locke seem just around the corner.Reflections on Aristotle and AquinasWe have been trying to summarize the thought of Aristotle and of Aquinasconcerning human knowing, and we have engaged in some commentaryas we went along.Let us stand back and comment more explicitly on whatthese authors say.Some of the things they talk about, such as the agentintellect, the phantasm, the intelligible species, and the word of the heart,may seem strange and perhaps quaint.Can we formulate these things ina less exotic way? What are Aristotle and Aquinas getting at? What phe-nomena are they describing?In particular, why do they distinguish between the agent and thereceptive intellect? These are not two different intellects but two aspects ofone mind.The distinction is their way of accounting for the differencebetween language and protolanguage.There is a radical break betweensensibility and its voiced expression, on the one hand, and intelligenceand its linguistic expression on the other; sensibility does not edge grad-ually into thinking, and the cut-and-dried syntax of language is a symptomof the fact that users of language have moved into an entirely new register.But how do we bootstrap ourselves into this new domain? The agentintellect or active mind is posited as the cause; the agent intellect has toexercise its power on the imagined phantasm in order to allow the intel-ligibility of the thing to come to light; the intelligibility cannot just bubbleup from sensibility.The mind must already be a mind in order to becomemore thoughtful and to learn new things, and the agent intellect is themind as already activated.But this seems to be a just-so story; the agentintellect seems to be as much a statement of the problem of how we breach25Summa theologiae I, q.85, a.2: Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundumeandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.49 q.2, a.1, ad10. Secundum autem quod intelligitres alias, intellectum in actu fit unum cum intellectu in actu, inquantum forma intellectifit forma intellectus, inquantum est intellectus in actu. 23Summa theologiae I, q.85, a.2, ad 1. Thomas Aquinas 297Despite positing these similitudes in the mind, Aquinas always insiststhat what we know first and foremost is the thing itself, not any of theintermediary likenesses.We do not infer the thing from what we know inthe mind; we know the thing directly.An entire article, Summa theologiaeI, q.85, a 2, is explicitly devoted to the question whether the intelligiblespecies is what we know, and Aquinas s answer is clear: That which isfirst known (intelligitur) is the thing of which the intelligible species isa similitude. In De veritate, q.3 a.2, Aquinas spells this out even moreclearly.He says that the similitudes definitely are not that which weknow; rather, they are that by which we know the thing directly.Concerning the intelligible species, he says, We see that the species, bywhich the intellect is informed in order that it can actually understand,is the first by which (primum quo) a thing is known. Then he goes on tospeak about the internal word (whether quiddity or judgment): Thequiddity that is formed in the intellect, or even the composition anddivision, is a certain product of [the intellect], through which theintellect arrives at the cognition of the exterior thing; and thus it is, as itwere, a second by which (secundum quo) a thing is known. 24 There isa first quo and then a second quo, and we must traverse both of them.There is a lot of mirroring going on here, even as we directly know thething in question.Aquinas is saying all the right things; he insists thatwe directly know the thing and not its likenesses in us; but it still seemsthat he is courting danger when he says, in this passage, that there aretwo such likenesses by which we know, first the received intelligiblespecies and second the generated internal word.I would also like todraw attention to the term quondam operatum ipsius, a certain product of[the intellect], which Aquinas uses to designate the internal word; thisis a strong term, which clearly makes the internal word rather thick asa representation.Aquinas says, therefore, that what we directly know is the thing, not thelikeness by which we know it.He does say that we can secondarily knowthe likeness as well.We do so when we reflect on our minds and ourintellectual activities, or rather when the mind reflects on itself.Speakingabout the intelligible species, Aquinas says, But because the intellectreflects on itself, according to that reflection it understands both its ownknowing and the species by which it knows.Thus, the intellectual species is24De veritate, q.3, a.2: Videmus quod species, qua intellectus informatur ut intelligat actu,est primum quo intelligitur; ex hoc autem quod est effectus in actu, per talem formamoperari iam potest formando quidditates rerum et componendo et dividendo; unde ipsaquidditas formata in intellectu, vel etiam compositio et divisio, est quoddam operatumipsius, per quod tamen intellectus venit in cognitionem rei exterioris; et sic est quasisecundum quo intelligitur. See Floucat, L intime fécondité de l intelligence, 73. 298 Ancients and Modernssecondarily that which is known. 25 Aquinas does not spell out thisreflective knowledge, but clearly it would not be a perception, since thespecies is not a perceivable thing, nor would it seem to involve any directintuition of the species.Aquinas s insistence that the thing we directly know is the thing itselfand not an idea of the thing is reassuring, but the constant use of theterm similitudes for intelligible species, concepts, judgments, and evenarguments does seem to substantialize them to an uncomfortable degree.As Bernardo Carlos Bazán says, with this doctrine Thomas inauguratesa kind of thought through intermediaries whose problems are enormous. 26Descartes and Locke seem just around the corner.Reflections on Aristotle and AquinasWe have been trying to summarize the thought of Aristotle and of Aquinasconcerning human knowing, and we have engaged in some commentaryas we went along.Let us stand back and comment more explicitly on whatthese authors say.Some of the things they talk about, such as the agentintellect, the phantasm, the intelligible species, and the word of the heart,may seem strange and perhaps quaint.Can we formulate these things ina less exotic way? What are Aristotle and Aquinas getting at? What phe-nomena are they describing?In particular, why do they distinguish between the agent and thereceptive intellect? These are not two different intellects but two aspects ofone mind.The distinction is their way of accounting for the differencebetween language and protolanguage.There is a radical break betweensensibility and its voiced expression, on the one hand, and intelligenceand its linguistic expression on the other; sensibility does not edge grad-ually into thinking, and the cut-and-dried syntax of language is a symptomof the fact that users of language have moved into an entirely new register.But how do we bootstrap ourselves into this new domain? The agentintellect or active mind is posited as the cause; the agent intellect has toexercise its power on the imagined phantasm in order to allow the intel-ligibility of the thing to come to light; the intelligibility cannot just bubbleup from sensibility.The mind must already be a mind in order to becomemore thoughtful and to learn new things, and the agent intellect is themind as already activated.But this seems to be a just-so story; the agentintellect seems to be as much a statement of the problem of how we breach25Summa theologiae I, q.85, a.2: Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundumeandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]